Abstract
We present a model of conflict in which each group decides to claim the country’s income and invest in arms or to accept a group neutral allocation of income and not invest in arms. Apart from the usual cooperative or conflictual societies, their strategic choice can result in hierarchically stratified societies in which one group is dominant. We show how the presence and exploitation of certain types of resources matters for the occurrence of conflict or social hierarchical stratification and for the possible effects of trust manipulation. In particular we find that, first, robust (encompassing point and lootable) resource rich economies tend to be conflictual, plantation economies hierarchically stratified and diversified economies cooperative. Second, foreign intervention, aimed at changing the balance of power in the case of conflict, is most effective in robust and diffuse resource rich economies. Third, trust manipulation (as a means to counter conflict) is most effective in subsistence and diffuse resource rich economies. Throughout the article, we cite ample case study and econometric evidence to support our model.
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Schollaert, A., Van de gaer, D. Natural Resources and Internal Conflict. Environ Resource Econ 44, 145–165 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9265-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9265-9