Abstract
One strain of thought that is both consistent with and an amplification of academic activism (Belknap in Criminology 53(1):1–22, 2015) is the critical criminological literature on transpraxis. As a theory of change, transpraxis advances a thesis on the dialogical and relational pedagogy of mutual struggle, of shared being and becoming. In addition, this literature critiques the dominant philosophy of human risk management and the current culture of captivity politics in which the struggle for transformative (i.e., interdependent and collective) change is “finalized.” We argue that, in the present era, processes of humanness and expressions of culture de-vitalize (e.g., homogenize, normalize, territorialize) this existence. In so doing, humanness and culture tend toward Hegelian reaction-negation dynamics, thereby forestalling and/or foreclosing justice for an awaiting people. Accordingly, this article outlines the dimensions of transpraxis as theory, explains how revolutionary academic activism necessitates a critical pedagogy for a people yet to be, and it reconceives the educational terrain of criminological activism as the pedagogy of becoming. We argue that the transpraxis properties of this pedagogy facilitate revolutionary academic activism and further the radical potential of transformative justice. This activism and potential exist for the multitude.
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Notes
The term is loosely traceable to the first author’s own philosophical work in which prospects for sociolegal resistance (Arrigo 2010) and forms of criminological trans-desistance (Arrigo 2015a) have been theorized as necessary but insufficient for the purpose of transformative justice. The term’s ascription to Dr. Belknap conveys the view that revolution also necessitates an “outsider jurisprudence” (Matsuda 1989, p. 2323; see also Valdes 2003) or a move toward “multidimensional analysis” (instead of critical intersectionality and standpoint epistemology) as the “standard of anti-subordination theory and praxis” (Valdes 1999, p. 897). As we subsequently argue, one facet of this multidimensional analysis focuses on a “people to come” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 108). Thus, instantiating this “otherness” is the ongoing project of the permanent revolution (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 1987). The site of this revolution is both beyond and other than epistemological standpoints (e.g., Medina 2008; Harding 2003) and critical intersectionality (e.g., Delgado and Stefanic 2012; Grabham et al. 2009; Potter 2013). This otherness is the site of becoming (e.g., transformation, transpraxis, justice for a people yet to be) rather than being (e.g., restoration, praxis, justice for people that is) (Deleuze 1983; see also, Capeheart and Milovanovic 2007, chapter 9; Crewe 2013; Milovanovic 2011a).
Although Professor Belknap does not expressly position her activist criminology within the anti-essentialist tradition (e.g., Grillo 1995; Wong 1999) or the post-colonial narrative (e.g., Spivak 1987; Young 2003), she does make clear that her praxis pedagogy necessitates that scholars be a “part of making political and societal change” (Belknap 2015, p. 2). For Dr. Belknap, this change is principally directed toward dismantling race, gender, class, and LGBTQ inequalities, and by logical extension, toward rethinking the institutional logics on which these essentialized realities have historically (i.e., Euro-centrically) been theorized, mathematized, and/or analyzed (for commentary on the relevance of anti-essentialism and anti-colonialism in the pedagogy of resistance see, Dei et al 2006).
For example, consider Iris Young’s (2011) deconstuctionist critique concerning the political (i.e., phallocentric) construction of distributive justice. She argues that expressions of difference (e.g., race, gender, class inequalities) are defined on the “impartial” terms of reasoning, “formal” conditions of equality, and “unitary” standard of “moral subjectivity” that both normalize this discursive reality-making and reify these differences as identity categories to be essentialized (Ibid., pp. 96–121).
As we explain in the subsequent section, it is not enough to return or to restore the subject’s identity (or an excluded group’s identity) to a state of political equilibrium (e.g., inclusion, enfranchisement) through reliance on categories of difference and their intersectional standpoints as derived from the praxis of resistance. Without something more, identity politics runs the risk of Hegelian “reaction-negation dynamics” whose activism “unwittingly functions to legitimize the power of the [re-constituted] status quo” (Arrigo et al. 2005, p. 37).
Watkins and Shulman (2008) characterize these ongoing tasks as “the participatory practices of liberation” (pp. 207–333). As an emergent pedagogy, these are the “participatory practices one can create that flow from new understandings of social pathologies.” (Ibid. p. 8). Thus, the question is begged: How would the educational terrain of academic activism be otherwise given these alternative understandings of oppression, and how might the pedagogy of this other terrain help to make possible “transformative” manifestations and recurrences of justice for a people yet to be (Arrigo and Milovanovic 2009, pp. 4–5; see also, Capeheart and Milovanovic 2007, chapter 12)?
Cornell (1998, p. 8) identifies the locus of this potential change within the imaginary domain. This domain is the “the space of the ‘as if’ in which we imagine who we might be if we made ourselves our own end and claimed ourselves as our own person.” For a detailed delineation of further directions in postmodern theorizing in criminology, see Milovanovic (2011b, pp. 154–156).
Drawing on insights developed by Freire (among others) on the ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’, Henry and Milovanovic (1996, p. 6) explained this phenomenon as symptomatic of the “false dualities” in social theorizing. As they noted, “History has shown us that some of the worst excesses can take place when a privileging of reflection over action or vice versa occurs, as in the case of simply reversing hierarchies, forms of political correctness, schmarixism (i.e. vulgar forms of Marxism), ‘exorcism’, and the politics of revenge” (Ibid, pp. 7–8). Missing from these dualisms is the shared or mutual project of change whose re-constitutive dynamics yield relations of power for a just people yet to be (Milovanovic 2011a).
Cornell (1991) makes this point in her critique of identity politics and the praxis of critical opposition whose problematic tendencies often reverse (without fully revolutionizing) epistemological and ontological hierarchies:
[R]ebellion against metaphysical oppositions cannot amount simply to a denial of their existence or an attempt to rise above them in already established ‘neutral’ discourse, there must be a ‘phase’ of overturning…necessary for the intervention into the hierarchical structure of opposition (p. 95; emphasis added).
The space beyond this phase of identity reclamation and restoration is the locus of criminological transpraxis. It exists outside of established identity categories, beyond scripted role sets, and apart from existing institutional logics. Its human geography is non-hegemonic in composition, making this space’s mapping a Foucauldian site of heterotopic (i.e., spatially-relational) meaning-making possibility.
Building on the work of Deleuze (1983) and Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1987), Arrigo and Milovanovic (2009) have described the “transformative subject” or the subject of “becoming” (p. 6) whose project of overcoming is akin to Nietzsche’s übermensch. As they explained it:
[The transformative subject] transcends existing categories of identity. This is the individual who continuously reconstitutes his or her humanity…always in movement and actively mutating – in order to become more fully human. As such, the subject, once having experienced restoration, reclamation, and recovery in being, is only then able to surpass the limitations of even these finite characterizations, categories, and codifications.
The übermensch risks humanness (identity) for the enrichment of humanity and for the enhancement of shared existence, and does so without constructing a “replacement discourse that rediscovers hierarchies anew” (Arrigo and Milovanovic 2009, p. 70). Thus, the project of overcoming for the transformative subject “demands the continual exploration and re-exploration of the possible and yet also the un-representable” (Cornell 1991, p. 169).
Dialogic expression is “unfinalizable” in that it is always incomplete, in-process, and productive of further response sequences. In this respect, then, dialogical meaning is never static or closed, and its teleology is directed toward each moment’s awaiting humanity (Bakhtin 1982, pp. 279–280).
Polizzi et al. (2014, pp. 3–4) have discussed the “offender treatment” custodial environment in which oppression (i.e., otherizing) subtly occurs and resistance (i.e., opposition) typically emerges, rendering dialogical overcoming (more humanistic restoration) and relational becoming (more interdependent and collective transformation) unimaginable, inexpressible, and unattainable. As they noted:
Current attitudes in corrections and offender treatment and the policy initiatives these evoke, reveal an underlying set of negatively defined socially constructed meanings about offenders that effectively contradict and undercut any superficial [let alone detailed] discussion about the benefits of rehabilitation, reentry, or restorative justice practices. It is very difficult to envision what successful work in corrections, offender psychotherapy, or rehabilitation would actually look like in such an environment. Successful work with offender populations will be difficult to achieve without first thoroughly addressing the way[s] in which these socially-generated definitions concerning who and what the offender is [the problem of identity claims-making], both restrict and actually prevent the type of success the criminal justice [and mental health] system[s] appear willing to pursue [the problem of identity change-making] (p. 4)
When this custodial environment is maintained as such, a “people yet to come" is precast in static identity categories rather than the possibilities that these categories are or could become.
Donati (2012, pp. 4–5) makes this point emphatically clear: “The starting point…is that the object of sociology is neither the so-called ‘subject’, nor the social system nor equivalent couplets (i.e., structure and agency, life-worlds and social systems, and so forth), but is the social relation itself.” For criminological applications of Donati’s thesis addressing the inter-relatedness of criminal desistance, recovery, and transformation among a friendship group of youth offenders whose life narratives connected them through adulthood see, Weaver and McNeill (2015).
Commenting on the dialectic of control at the core of Hegelian thought, the conservatism (as opposed to radicalism) that it politicizes, and the reactive change that it reifies, Arrigo et al (2005, p. 39) noted: “In the Nietzschean paradigm, the slave states values actively and affirmatively, s/he is not inherently caught up in the Hegelian master–slave dialectic. The slave’s affirmative action contains within it a beyond, a vision of the possible, a transpraxis.” The site of this overcoming includes in-formation networks and assemblages derived from latent desire (i.e., unleashed libidinal production) and awaiting human capital (i.e., unharnessed economic production) (Deleuze 1983). In the present era, humanness and culture de-vitalize (e.g., homogenize, normalize, territorialize) the possibilities of such transformations.
We note that inquiries into the nature of complex systems represent a house divided among positivists, post positivists (realists) and post-modernists. Our perspective principally takes direction from the latter framework. From its inception, the theory and science of dynamical systems has been inspired by the “inherent creativity,” “spontaneous appearance of novel structures,” and the “autonomous adaptation to a changing environment” (Heylighen 2001, p. 253) that characterizes all complex physical and social systems. These inquiries focus on the complexity of the whole system, emphasizing the system’s non-linearity or pattern-forming chaos (i.e., orderly disorder).
Additional concepts include: bifurcation, dissipative structures, sensitive dependence on initial conditions, attractors, fractals, iteration, etc. (for an overview of these principles in which prospects for critical social justice and legal change are theorized see, Arrigo and Barrett 2008).
The strangeness of this justice concerns itself with the “de-territorialization and re-territorialization” (Arrigo and Milovanovic 2009, p. 168) of subjectivity. Re-vitalizing or re-visceralizing this subjectivity continuously entails “challenging conventional body boundaries, taking the risk of becoming indiscernible as a social subject, and unsettling a coherent sense of personal self” (Lorraine 1999, p. 183).
More specifically, the will-to-power (Nietzsche’s 1966, 1968; see also, Deleuze 1983) is the composite of identity claims-making that the human subject risks and releases when summoning from within and moving toward the power of latent, although dialogically retrievable, shared (intra/inter-communicative) humanness. This is the coproduction of mutual restoration at work when naturally and authentically adapting to the power of shared identity or an existence of being for “the Other’s infiniteness” (Levinas 1969, p. 33), including the Other’s “uniqueness and alterity” (Cornell 1998, p. 140). Further, the way-to-power (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 1987) is the composite of identity change-making that the human subject risks and releases when harnessing the power of shared restoration (i.e., the mutuality of identity) and situating oneself within more untapped, although relationally retrievable, interdependent and collective humanness. This is the coproduction of shared transformation at work when organically and dynamically self-organizing; of settling within the power of human eco-system non-linearity or the space of becoming for that enhances the complex whole system (i.e., all of human identity). This is the permanent revolution (Deleuze and Guattari (1987) for the multitude’s ongoing (communalized) metamorphosis (Hardt and Negri 2004).
The diversity of human subjectivity (i.e., processes of humanness and expressions of culture) is assumed to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of the multitude’s becoming. As Hardt and Negri (2004) noted:
[The multitude] is composed of innumerable internal differences that can never be reduced to a unity or a
single identity – different cultures, races, ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations; different forms of labor; different ways of living; different views of the world; and different desires (p. xiv).
The struggle, then, is about physicalizing the sufficient conditions “for a social multiplicity to manage to communicate and act in common while remaining internally different (Ibid.). Activating the potential of these conditions is for a becoming people. This is the shared activist journey of furthering the “virtue” of justice which “only finds complete realization within a human community…the collectivity as a [complex] whole” (Ruggiero 2015, pp. 112–113).
One example of this imminence is found at the juncture of quantum physics and holographic theory as fitted to criminological concerns (Milovanovic 2013, 2014). Here, justice for a people yet to be is observable at the subatomic (molecular) level. At this level, the world “out there” (including processes of humanness and expressions of culture) appears as waves (moving quanta) rather than as particles (static matter) that collapses from a cloud of possibilities. These possibilities are sub-atomic energy moving/forming data (i.e., probability waves). Each of these waves contains holographically encoded data that are sub-atomically retrievable. This collapse occurs from the “entanglements” (the intersecting uniqueness or interference) of two energy emitting/receiving wave patterns. These entanglements are the basis of Einstein’s notion of “concrescence” or the course of instantiation. Einstein’s special and general relativity theorems re-conceptualized homogeneous space in terms of spacetime; that is, space and time were understood to be inseparable entities that were scientifically observable as such at the molecular level. Thus, as in-formation vibratory energy movement, instantiating justice for a people yet to be is an activist practice whose pending status can be statistically recorded and empirically verified. For detailed analysis on the science of integrating quantum mechanics with holographic theory, see Stapp (2004, 2007).
Commenting on this power, Delanty (2009, p. 73) notes that “Societal processes of a global nature [exist] that require a cosmopolitan response…rooted in the very [shared coordinates] of human experience.”
A critical cosmopolitan imagination temporarily challenges, resists, and/or debunks the constructed reality on which discourses (and their human producers) depend for their support, and this imagination adaptively and dynamically reconceives the social existence from which these discourses (and their human producers) could otherwise communicate (e.g., inhabiting and mobilizing the vitalization of justice for a people yet to be). When the form and content of these discourses and their corresponding truth regimes are destabilized, “social and economic… and political implications [appear that] require a new kind of imagination” (Delanty 2009, p. ix; see also, Arrigo 2013, p. 684). One of these implications is the composition of justice for the multitude and its current communicative (i.e., dialogical and relational) finalization (Milovanovic 2011a).
The notion of “replacement discourses” (Henry and Milovanovic 1996, p. 6) is a pedagogical antecedent to the shared practices of communicative liberation. The former is derived, in part, from the critical pedagogy of Freire (1973), the psychoanalytic semiotics of Lacan (2006), the deconstructionist philosophy of Derrida (1978), and the genealogical analysis of Foucault (1977). Replacement discourses presuppose that “reflection and action,” (Henry and Milovanovic 1996, p. 7) make critical consciousness or “conscientization” possible for the “speaking [of] true words” (Freire 1973, p. 77). The thesis on communicative liberation argues that the dialogical (mutually restorative) and relational (interdependently and collectively transformative) power of speaking true words is equally revolutionary (Arrigo and Milovanovic 2009; Arrigo et al. 2011; Arrigo 2015a). Diagnosing (reflecting on) and assessing (acting on) the coordinates that could make such speech representable are themselves constitutive of the critical pedagogy of becoming.
The idea of “assemblages “or assemblage theory (DeLanda 2006) is adapted from Deleuze’s (1995; see also Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 1987) work on control society. In this society, emphasis is placed on “relations of exteriority” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, pp. 71, 88–91, 323–337, 503–505). These are the relations that any system encounters if it is composed of self-subsistent parts (i.e., not an organic unity or totality). In control society, ontology is fluid, contingent, heterogeneous, and thus, composed of an inextricable combination of interrelated parts. The assemblage of these parts depends on flows (i.e., inputs, perturbations, iterations) that configure, temporarily, the non-organismic self. At issue, then, is the assembling of the dialogical and relational multitude and three of its self-subsistent undulating parts (i.e., consciousness, subjectivity, and power). As constitutive of our critical pedagogy on becoming, reliance on assemblage theory draws attention to the contingent interactions between these parts as well as the emergent properties of the complex whole (for an elaboration of these conditions as derived from Nietzsche’s radical freedom see, Arrigo 2015a, pp. 12–16; for applications of assemblage theory to the bio-political manufacturing of race in constructions of the human see, Weheliye 2014).
The unconscious is structured like a language (e.g., Lacan 2006). This language speaks the subject from within a particular system of sign and symbolization meanings. These meanings regulate processes of humanness through the flows of stasis, predictability, normativity or the “laws of the father” (Ibid. p. 230). When recursively assembled, these flows/forces constitute a “master” discourse. But, what are the dialogical and relational coordinates of shared humanness as a system of sign and symbolization meaning? They (these coordinates) are the multitude’s “lack” or incompleteness (Lacan 2006, pp. 360–363) that awaits mental representation in the language of collective (un)consciousness.
As Hardt and Negri (2004) explain, the digital dimension of globalization has brought with it new forms of communicative action in which “only temporary alliance[s] can be the basis of new forms of struggle” Arrigo and Milovanovic 2009, p. 56). For a social multiplicity to endure in the Informational Age of ‘dividuals’ (i.e., data doubles), “surveillant assemblages” (e.g., predictive analytics)and “social sorting” (i.e., actuarial justice) (Haggerty and Ericson 2000, pp. 612–615; Lyon 2006), no “inherent potential for stasis will exist[]; rather, the multitude [will be] characterized by its constantly evolving, mutating, and transforming nature marked by differences” (Arrigo and Milovanovic 2009, p. 56). These differences and the social multiplicity needed to support them co-exist while the dialogical and relational blurring of biological and digital bodies proliferates (Bauman and Lyon 2013).
Because thought already and always assumes the form and content of a language (e.g., Derrida 1978), the metaphysical question to ponder is as follows: whose voice and which ways of knowing saturate the thoughts that we think? For example, based in part on insights derived from Foucault (e.g., 1977) examining the ‘conduct of conduct’, Pavlich (2005, p. 10) provides a critical analysis of “the mentalities of governances” that choreograph and legitimize restorative justice (RJ) practices. As he observed:
These mentalities of governance entail specific political rationales; as logics of how to rule they define such matters as what is governed, who is governed, who does the governing and what governing itself properly entails. Such governmentalities render particular ideas and practices (rationales and techniques of governing) understandable, conceivable, viable, and indeed practicable (Ibid).
The politics of this “othering”(Young J 2011, p. 63) includes the conservative prescription of categorical stigmatization (e.g., the other as welfare queen, psychotic killer, juvenile offender, homeless alcoholic) and the liberal prescription of deficit-correcting (e.g., the other as needing more education, better socialization, additional medication, further controls).
Consider, for example, how surveillance technology innovations have reconceived the management of human risk and correspondingly intensified the politics of captivity. Examples include predictive policing and data analytics, the new penology and actuarial justice, radio frequency identification (“tagging”) of paroled offenders and GPS monitoring (“tracking”) of diverted juveniles, synoptic surveillance and fMRI technology. These are the apparatuses of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1984, 1987) control society—a hyper-real state of existence in which the experiences of crime and justice, law and order, violence and victimization, etc., are “situations” to control through digital passwords/pass-wording. Normalizing this serialized existence converts (i.e., abstracts) objects, events, and people into (for their) mere informational (i.e., encrypted and encoded) utility.
In the current era, the fusion of the biological and the digital (i.e. the bio-digital) is an assemblage. The whole system complexity of its inter/intra-communicatively restorative and its interdependently and collectively transformative forces/flows necessitates a heterotopic ethic (of science).
In the study of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics, this ubiquity makes possible the problem of entropy. Entropy occurs when an organism—as a complex dynamical system—ceases to take in energy. Entropy is a measure of system disorder that can perturb an organism to deep chaos, including de-vitalization.
As we have explained elsewhere, the phenomenology of this figure represents the “criminology of the shadow” (Arrigo and Milovanovic 2009, pp. 134–146).
To illustrate, consider the work of critical geographers. Among these scholars and activists alike, space and hierarchy are theorized as forms of “site-ontology” (Woodward et al. 2012, p. 204). An important feature of this theory is how “the site might initiate politics that neither presuppose nor undergird individual subject positionalities or mass identitarian categories” (Ibid.). Critical criminologists have yet to seize upon the anti-subordination pedagogy inherent in these insights.
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Arrigo, B.A., Bersot, H.Y. Revolutionizing Academic Activism: Transpraxis, Critical Pedagogy, and Justice for a People Yet to Be. Crit Crim 24, 549–564 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-016-9328-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-016-9328-5