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Corruption control

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Abstract

How can we explain why countries that apply similar remedies against corruption vary so much in their actual incidence of corruption? While high penalties for business crime may prevent corruption in some situations, it may exacerbate the problem in others. We find enforcement of laws against corruption to depend on the form of cooperation between layers of law enforcement authority in the state administration. Small local differences in honesty and cooperation may lead to large differences in effective law enforcement and in actual levels of corruption.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Box 1095 Blindern, 0317, Oslo, Norway

    Karl Moene

  2. Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law, Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway

    Tina Søreide

Authors
  1. Karl Moene
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  2. Tina Søreide
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Karl Moene.

Appendix

Appendix

This appendix informs about the sources of data presented in Table 1. The countries listed are categorized according to their income levels using income (GNI) per capita- as described by the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#OECD_members and World Bank (2013) [24].

Sources for the data included:

Ombudsman function: Whether such an institution exists in the country. Source: International Ombudsman Institute (http://www.theioi.org/ioi-members)

  • Audit institution: Whether in existence. Source: International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (http://www.intosai.org/about-us/organisation/membership-list.html)

  • Access to information law: X = yes, law in line with int. best practice; v* = by constitution, citizens have right to information, yet a legal framework for securing access to information is missing. Score included in parenthesis: Global right to Information Rating (RTI): whether legal framework recognizes citizens’ fundamental right of access to information. Country rank based on scope of these laws. RTI Rating is limited to measuring the legal framework, and does not measure quality of implementation. Score based on formal rules securing/supposed to secure Right of Access, Scope, Requesting Procedures, Exceptions and Refusals, Appeals, Sanctions and Protections, and Promotional Measures. http://www.rti-rating.org/

  • Rule of law (overall performance): Source: World Justice Project. Rule of Law Index (http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index)

  • Perceived extent of corruption: Survey-respondents’ perceived extent of corruption. Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI). http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015

Corruption in the judiciary: Source: World Justice Project. Sub-factor behind the Rule of Law Index.

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Moene, K., Søreide, T. Corruption control. Crime Law Soc Change 66, 147–163 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9618-6

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