Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

The multi-shade paradox of public corruption: the Moldovan case of dirty hands and collective action

  • Published:
Crime, Law and Social Change Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Corruption is an undoubtedly a difficult conceptual area to operate in. This is particularly accurate for the post-Soviet space, where seemingly mutually exclusive forces appear to coexist on regular basis, defying and rejecting rational interpretations. Standard assumptions, definitions and theoretical perspectives often fail to generate useful understandings of corruption in Eastern Europe, habitually obscuring fundamental patterns, hence leaving corruption largely misunderstood. In order to construct anticorruption policies that would be effective in the environment where corruption is systemic, it is critical to resist the temptation of eschewing the complexity of societal factors by over-focusing on the corrupt individual. In an effort to reemphasize the imperative role played by societal variables in explaining corruption in the post-Soviet space, this article uses insights gathered from studying corruption in Republic of Moldova to discuss the role of three fundamental dynamics: “dirty hands,” the problem of “collective action” and the achromatic schema of white-gray-black corruption.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For the purposes of this paper “Eastern Europe” is understood as the European “bloc” of the former Soviet space.

  2. See Ledeneva [20] for a well-articulated critique of the assumptions, preconceptions and methodology of the “corruption paradigm.”

  3. The Republic of Moldova is often perceived to be one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. For instance, its Corruption Perception Index score for 2012 was 36 [43]. The score represents an estimate of the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 stands for highly corrupt and 100 stands for not-corrupt. According to the European Commission [9] corruption remains a very serious concern for all levels of government in Moldova.

  4. Curiously, public administration literature has dedicated little attention to this issue. There is something “inherently uncomfortable” about the admission that administrative action demands or at least is associated with opportunities to dirty one’s hands.

  5. That is assuming that that one originally intended to and after assuming office still can or is willing to serve the public, which is obviously a rather naïve hope.

  6. Informal exchanges of benefits (e.g. goods, jobs) using personal and kinship networks that go around formal procedural structures.

  7. All concerns regarding the shortcomings of perception-based rankings and indexes are still in order here; yet, they are not central to the purpose of this comparison.

  8. For instance changing “overnight” all traffic officers or the staff of a knowingly corrupt agency or department (an approach apparently favored by Georgia).

References

  1. Bäck, H., & Hadenius, A. (2008). Democracy and state capacity: exploring a J-shaped relationship. Governance An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions, 21(1), 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Barsukova, S. (2009). Corruption. Russian Politics and Law, 47(4), 8–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Bates, R. H. (1988). Toward a political economy of development: A rational choice perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Brass, D., Butterfield, K. D., & Skaggs, B. C. (1998). Relationships and unethical behavior: a social network perspective. Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 14–31.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Bukovansky, M. (2006). The hollowness of anti-corruption discourse. Review of International Political Economy, 13(2), 181–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. de Graaf, G. (2007). Causes of corruption: towards a contextual theory of corruption. Public Administration Quarterly, 31(1), 39–86.

    Google Scholar 

  7. de Graaf, G., & Huberts, L. W. J. C. (2008). Portraying the nature of corruption using an explorative case study design. Public Administration Review, 68(4), 640–653.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Djilas, M. (1957/1985). The new class: An analysis of the communist system. New York, NY: A Harvest/HBJ.

  9. European Commission (2013a). Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Republic of Moldova: Progress in 2012 and recommendations for action. Joint Staff Working Document. Retrieved from the European Union website: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_moldova_en.pdf

  10. European Commission (2012). Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Georgia: Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action. Joint Staff Working Document. Retrieved from the European Union website: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_georgia_en.pdf

  11. Grødeland, A. (2010). Elite perceptions of anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine. Global Crime, 11(2), 237–260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Hasty, J. (2005). The pleasures of corruption: desire and discipline in Ghanaian political culture. Cultural Anthropology, 20(2), 271–301.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Heidenheimer, A. J. (2004). Disjunctions between corruption and democracy? A qualitative exploration. Crime Law & Social Change, 42(1), 99–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Huberts, L. W. J. C., & Nelen, J. M. (2005). Corruptie in het Nederlandse openbaar bestuur: Omvang, aard en afdoening [Corruption in government in the Netherlands: Extent, nature and prosecution]. Utrecht: Lemma.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of corruption: Wealth, power, and democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  16. Karklins, R. (2005). The system made me do it: Corruption in post-communist societies. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Kornai, J. (2006). The great transformation of Central Eastern Europe: success and disappointment. Economics of Transition, 14(2), 207–244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Kotkin, S., & Sajo, A. (Eds.). (2002). Political corruption in transition: A skeptic’s handbook. Budapest: Central European University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Lawson, L. (2009). The politics of anti-corruption reform in Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 47(1), 73–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Ledeneva, A. (2009). Corruption in postcommunist societies in Europe: a re-examination. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10(1), 69–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Ledeneva, A. (2009). From Russia with blat: can informal networks help modernize Russia? Social Research, 76(1), 257–288.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Ledeneva, A. (2011). Open secrets and knowing smiles. East European Politics and Societies, 25(4), 720–736.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Meagher, P. (2005). Anti-corruption agencies: Rhetoric versus reality. Journal of Policy Reform, 8(1), 69–103.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Miller, W. L. (2006). Corruption and corruptibility. World Development, 34(2), 371–380.

  25. Miller, W. L., Grødeland, Å. B., & Koshechkina, T. Y. (2001). A culture of corruption? Coping with government in post-communist Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). Corruption: diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Democracy, 17(3), 86–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013). Controlling corruption through collective action. Journal of Democracy, 24(1), 101–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Newburn, T. (1999). Understanding and preventing police corruption: Lessons from the literature. Police Research Series (110). London: Home Office.

    Google Scholar 

  29. OECD (2010). OECD anti-corruption network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Georgia monitoring report. Paris, France: OECD. Retrieved from OECD website: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/istanbulactionplan/44997416.pdf

  30. Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2012). Why anticorruption reforms fail – systemic corruption as a collective action problem. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions.

  33. Punch, M. (2000). Police corruption and its prevention. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 8(3), 301–324.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Rayfield, D. (2012). Edge of empires: A history of Georgia. London: Reaktion Books Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Roman, A. V. (2012). The Myths within anticorruption policies. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 34(2), 237–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  36. Roman, A. V., & Miller, H. T. (2013). Building Social Cohesion: Family, Friends, and Corruption. Administration & Society.

  37. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  38. Rothstein, B. (2005). Social traps and the problem of trust. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  39. Rothstein, B. (2011). Anti-corruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach. Review of International Political Economy, 18(2), 228–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  40. Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 19–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  41. Sung, H. (2004). Democracy and political corruption: a cross-national comparison. Crime Law & Social Change, 41(2), 179–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. The Economist (2012). Georgia’s mental revolution: Seven years after the Rose revolution, Georgia has come a long way. Retrieved from The Economist website: http://www.economist.com/node/16847798

  43. Transparency International (2012). Corruption perception index 2012. Retrieved from the Transparency International website: http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/

  44. Uslaner, E. M. (2008). Corruption, inequality, and the rule of law. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  45. Vardi, Y., & Weitz, E. (2004). Misbehavior in organizations: Theory, research and management. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Walzer, M. (1973). Political action: the problem of dirty hands. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2(2), 160–180.

    Google Scholar 

  47. World Bank. (2012). Fighting corruption in public services: Chronicling Georgia’s Reforms. Directions in development: Public sector governance (66449). Washington, DC: The World Bank.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. California State University San Bernardino, San Bernardino, CA, USA

    Alexandru Roman

Authors
  1. Alexandru Roman
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alexandru Roman.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Roman, A. The multi-shade paradox of public corruption: the Moldovan case of dirty hands and collective action. Crime Law Soc Change 62, 65–80 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-014-9519-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-014-9519-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation