Abstract
Police reform plays a key role in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s internationally-supervised statebuilding process. It is one of the four key conditions to move the country closer to its European future. Against this background the article analyses the role that the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) plays in preparing Bosnian police agencies for this challenge. Using as guiding tools some of the key elements of the Mission’s leitmotif—local ownership, European police standards—the article comes to the conclusion that EUPM has introduced much needed reforms but these have been overshadowed, among other things, by the police restructuring process and its unnecessary politicisation of “European police standards/practices” to fit a model of statehood not shared by all local stakeholders.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Hereinafter ‘Bosnia’ or ‘BiH’.
The other three are public broadcast service reform, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and public administration reform. Bosnia did in fact sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on 16 June 2008, thanks mainly to progress in the police restructuring process that will be discussed later in the article. The SAA is a contractual arrangement that provides the EU with the formal mechanisms and agreed benchmarks it needs to work with each South Eastern European country in order to bring them closer to EU standards.
The position of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, now also the European Union's Special Representative, was created in 1995 immediately after the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee the implementation of this agreement.
Judy Batt goes further by arguing that this political crisis exposes the failure, rather than the fragility, of the internationally-supervised statebuilding process (2007, quoted in [3]).
The analysis will mainly include elements of the first two EUPM mandates (2003-2005, 2006-2007). The Mission is currently under its third mandate, due to expire in December 2009.
The Dayton Peace Accords resulted in a system made up of 13 police agencies that during, the UN and EU periods, increased to 15 with the creation of two state-level police structures. These are: (1) at the state level, the State Border Service and the State Investigation and Protection Agency; (2) at the Entity level, the Federation Police and the Republika Srpska police; (3) the Brčko District Police; and (4) within the Federation, the ten Cantonal police agencies. Unlike the Federation, Republika Srpska has a centralised system composed of Public Security Centres but with decision-making powers concentrated in Banja Luka.
Confidential interview, Sarajevo, 2002.
At the same time, despite this determination to start anew, much of what was developed at the operational level was influenced by the modus operandi established by UNMIBH/IPTF. For more details see [4].
The second and third mandates have built on this original mandate while changing their scope to address the operational problems faced during the 2003-2005 period. For more details see EUPM’s website, www.eupm.org
Local ownership is understood here to mean local participation in the reform process but also local capacity to govern policing matters.
Confidential interview, Sarajevo, 2006.
Unlike the UN mission, EUPM does not enjoy the power to order dismissals of police officers. It can refer names for dismissal to the OHR/EUSR. One of the few examples of EUPM’s use of this prerogative took place during its second mandate. It recommended, together with the EU military force in Bosnia (EUFOR), the suspension of the Deputy Head of Administration for Police Education of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska (RS), Dragomir Andan. The OHR decision, taken in July 2007, also applied to 35 of Andan’s officers, all suspected of involvement in war crimes or of helping war criminals evade justice as concluded by the Bosnian Serb government Commission on Srebrenica.
EUPM and the Swiss Development Cooperation Agency also sat in the meetings of the framework working group. Needless to say, this framework strategy is a step forward but much remains to be done before community policy takes roots in Bosnia. This strategy is not as comprehensive as originally expected and, moreover, some police experts remain sceptical about the value of what was achieved during the UN and/or EUPM period: “sporadic” and “unsystematic”, a scratch in the police surface (Confidential interviews, Sarajevo, 2006).
Confidential interview, Sarajevo, 2006.
UN police officers had been more widely co-located, reaching all levels of the police structures, down to police stations. For reasons of size and approach, this policy was regarded as unnecessary during the EUPM period, something that was not shared by all analysts on the ground (Confidential interviews, Sarajevo, 2003).
Confidential interviews, Sarajevo and via email, 2006.
The example of Doboj–known as a stronghold of extreme Serb nationalism during the war and the immediate post-conflict phase-has been used by the European Stability Initiative as a clear illustration of the much improved security situation in the country [15].
Confidential interviews, Sarajevo and Brussels, 2002-2007.
Confidential interviews, various locations in Bosnia and Brussels, 2002-2007.
Confidential interview, Sarajevo, 2006.
The Court ruled that genocide had taken place in the 1995 massacres of Bosniaks in Srebrenica but Serbia could not be found guilty of that even if it provided military and financial aid to the Republika Srpska (RS) army and police. The Court could only find Serbia guilty of failing to stop genocide but even then, Bosnia could not demand reparations from this country. Haris Silajdžić, member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, called for the abolition of the RS based on the ICJ finding that genocide has indeed taken place in Srebrenica and a Bosniak initiative has sought to remove Srebrenica from RS jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Milorad Dodik, RS Prime Minister, has refused to accept that the RS is guilty of genocide and has pushed for a federal solution to the current Bosnian map. The relationship between these two leaders has tainted the police restructuring process which, as initially shaped by the Martens Commission, would have led to decisive political and constitutional changes.
Confidential interviews, Travnik and Sarajevo, 2003.
Examples of such reforms include EUPM’s work in strengthening state-level institutions (the State Border Service and the State Investigation and Protection Agency); harmonising throughout the country standards and procedures relating to police academy curricula, promotion and selection, accountability, etc. to minimise political intrusion in police matters; and the introduction of information databases/networks to be shared among all police agencies in the country.
Confidential interviews, Sarajevo, 2006.
Confidential interviews, Sarajevo, 2006.
EUPM has been characterised–at least for a long time–for having a strong police identity that has at times worked against the role of civilians within the Mission.
References
Aitchison, A. (2007). Police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: state, democracy and international assistance. Policing & Society, 17(4), 321–343.
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (2007). Bosnia PM Resigns. BIRN: 1 November. http://www.birn.eu.com/en/110/15/5471/. Accessed 16 September 2008.
Chandler, D. (2007). Introduction: Inside the Bosnian crisis. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(Special Supplement), 1–10.
Collantes Celador, G. (2007a). The European Union Police mission: The beginning of a new future for Bosnia and Herzegovina? Working Paper No. 9. Barcelona: Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI).
Collantes Celador, G. (2007b). The EU’s capacity to engage in security sector reform: Lessons from Police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. in the European Union and security sector reform (pp. 41–52). workshop report. Research Report Series Acta B. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College.
Council of the EU (2002). Council Joint Action of 11 March 2002 on the European Union Police Mission (2002/210/CFSP). Official Journal of the European Communities. 25 November. L70/1-6. Brussels: Council of the EU.
European Union (2005). Report from the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union to the UN Security Council on the activities of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, covering the period 1 July to 31 December 2004. 11 February. UN Document S/2005/66. New York & Brussels.
EUPM (2002). Strategy implementation plan. december. Sarajevo: EUPM.
EUPM (2006a). All BiH law enforcement agencies still need international support. Mission Mag, 10, 22 December. 6–7.
EUPM (2006b). Representation of Women in EUPM. Mission Mag, 1, August.
EUPM (2007). BiH to get community policing strategy. Mission Mag, 15, 18 March.
Holbrooke, R. (2007). Back to the brink in the Balkans. The Washington Post, 25 November.
International Centre for Migration Policy Development and TC Consult (2004). Final assessment report—financial, organisational and administrative assessment of the BiH Police forces and the state border service. Sarajevo: ICMPD.
International Crisis Group (1999). Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement. Europe Report no. 80. Sarajevo: International Crisis Group.
Knaus, G. (2007). El Conflicto de Kosovo: Alternativas para la Union Europea (The Kosovo Conflict: Alternatives for the European Union). Speech given at the CIDOB Foundation. 19 November. Barcelona.
Loza, T. (2007). Bosnia: Condition Serious but Stable. Transitions Online, 11 December.
Merlingen, M., & Ostrauskaite, R. (2006). European Union peacebuilding and policing. London: Routledge.
Muehlmann, T. (2007). Police restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: problems of internationally-led security sector reform. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(Special Supplement), 37–65.
Osland, K. M. (2004). The EU Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International Peacekeeping, 11(3), 544–560.
Orsini, D. (2006). Future of ESDP: lessons from Bosnia. European Security Review, 29(June), 9–12.
Police Restructuring Commission (2004). Final report on the work of the Police restructuring commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 31 December. Sarajevo: PRC.
Solana, J. (2003). Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the Opening Ceremony of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM). 15 January. S0004/03. Sarajevo: Council of the European Union.
The Economist (2007). Le Paris Flambé, 1 December.
Wisler, D. (2007). The international Civilian Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From democratization to nation-building. Police Practice and Research, 8(3), 253–268.
Acknowledgements
This article forms part of the author’s long-term academic research into the role of police reform in the post-conflict reconstruction of war-torn societies. The preparation and drafting of this article would have not been possible without the assistance provided by members of the EU family and the international community more generally, as well as Bosnian officials, during interviews in the 2002–2007 period. For reasons of confidentiality neither their names nor their specific institutional affiliations will be disclosed. The author is also grateful to the reviewers and editors for their comments of previous drafts. The author alone is responsible for all statements and errors/omissions made in this article.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Collantes Celador, G. Becoming ‘European’ through police reform: a successful strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina?. Crime Law Soc Change 51, 231–242 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-008-9157-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-008-9157-x