Skip to main content
Log in

A Model for Ethical Decision Making in Business: Reasoning, Intuition, and Rational Moral Principles

  • Published:
Journal of Business Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

How do business leaders make ethical decisions? Given the significant and wide-spread impact of business people’s decisions on multiple constituents (e.g., customers, employees, shareholders, competitors, and suppliers), how they make decisions matters. Unethical decisions harm the decision makers themselves as well as others, whereas ethical decisions have the opposite effect. Based on data from a study on strategic decision making by 16 effective chief executive officers (and three not-so-effective ones as contrast), I propose a model for ethical decision making in business in which reasoning (conscious processing) and intuition (subconscious processing) interact through forming, recalling, and applying moral principles necessary for long-term success in business. Following the CEOs in the study, I employ a relatively new theory, rational egoism, as the substantive content of the model and argue it to be consistent with the requirements of long-term business success. Besides explaining the processes of forming and applying principles (integration by essentials and spiraling), I briefly describe rational egoism and illustrate the model with a contemporary moral dilemma of downsizing. I conclude with implications for further research and ethical decision making in business.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This section closely follows the presentation of integration by essentials in Woiceshyn (2009).

  2. This point is controversial as ethicists have not been able agree that there is a factual basis of moral principles. In contrast to most philosophers, there are some who start from the naturalistic premise that facts about human nature give rise to the need of ethics; that humans need to act according to the requirements of their nature in order to survive and flourish (Foot 2001; Gaut 1997; Hursthouse 1999). Continuing on that premise, others have argued that ethics is like any other science, and that facts can validate moral principles in the same way as they validate or invalidate any other kind of principles (Simpson 2009; Smith 2006).

  3. This happens automatically once a principle has been identified.

References

  • Binswanger, H. (1995). Psycho-epistemology. Lectures delivered at the Lyceum International summer conference, San Francisco, CA, USA. Available on cd from www.aynrandbookstore2.com.

  • Bowie, N. E. (2009). How empirical research in human cognition does and does not affect philosophical ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 635–643.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1082–1089.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dane, E., & Pratt, M. G. (2007). Exploring the role of intuition in managerial decision making. Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 33–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DesJardins, J. (2006). An introduction to business ethics. New York: McGraw Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. (1994). Toward a unified conception of business ethics: Integrative social contracts theory. Academy of Management Review, 19(2), 252–284.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferrell, O., Fraedrich, J., & Ferrell, L. (2005). Business ethics: Ethical decision making and cases. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foot, P. (2001). Natural goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press (quoted in Smith, 2006, p. 2).

  • Frederiksen, C. S. (2010). The relation between policies concerning corporate social responsibility (CSR) and philosophical moral theories—an empirical investigation. Journal of Business Ethics, 93, 357–371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gaut, B. (1997). The structure of practical reason. In G. Cullity & B. Gaut (Eds.), Ethics and practical reason (pp. 161–188). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814–834.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haidt, J., & Bjorklund, F. (2008). Social intuitionists reason, as normal part of conversation. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, volume 2: The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harung, H. (1993). More effective decisions through synergy of objective and subjective approaches. Management Decision, 31(7), 38–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hills, A. (2010). The beloved self. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hunt, S., & Vitell, S. (1984). A general theory of marketing ethics. Journal of Macromarketing, 6, 5–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hursthouse, R. (1999). On virtue ethics. New York: Oxford University Press (quoted in Smith 2006, p. 2).

  • Jensen, M. C. (2002). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2(2), 235–256.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, T. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-contingent model. Academy of Management Review, 16, 366–395.

    Google Scholar 

  • Khatri, N., & Ng, H. A. (2000). The role of intuition in strategic decision making. Human Relations, 53(1), 57–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, G. (2001). Sources of power: How people make decisions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, G. (2003). Power of intuition. New York: Doubleday.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kohlberg, L. (1973). The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral judgment. Journal of Philosophy, 70(18), 630–646.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, C. (1996). The sources of normativity. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lieberman, M., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D., & Trope, Y. (2002). Reflexion and reflection: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 199–249). New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Locke, E. A. (2000). The prime movers: Traits of the great wealth creators. New York: AMACOM.

    Google Scholar 

  • Locke, E. A. (2002). The epistemological side of teaching management: Teaching through principles. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 1, 195–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Locke, E. A. (2006). Business ethics: A way out of the morass. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 5, 324–332.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maitland, I. (2002). The human face of self-interest. Journal of Business Ethics, 38, 3–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miner, M., & Petocz, A. (2003). Moral theory in ethical decision making: Problems, clarification and recommendations from a psychological perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 42, 11–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. (1903/1951). Principia ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • O’Fallon, M. J., & Butterfield, K. D. (2005). A review of the empirical ethical decision-making literature: 1996–2003. Journal of Business Ethics, 59, 375–413.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oliver, D., & Roos, J. (2005). Decision-making in high-velocity environments: The importance of guiding principles. Organization Studies, 26(6), 889–913.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peikoff, L. (1989). Why should one act on principle? Intellectual Activist, 4(20), 2–6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peikoff, L. (1991). Objectivism: The philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Dutton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pondy, L. R. (1983). The union of rationality and intuition in management action. In S. Shrivastava & associates (Eds.), The executive mind. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

  • Premeaux, S. (2004). The current link between management behavior and ethical philosophy. Journal of Business Ethics, 52, 269–278.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Puris, M. (1999). Comeback: How seven straight-shooting CEOs turned around troubled companies. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rand, A. (1964). The objectivist ethics. In A. Rand (Ed.), The virtue of selfishness (pp. 13–35). New York: Signet/Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rand, A. (1990). Introduction to objectivist epistemology. Expanded second edition. New York: Meridian.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rest, J. (1986). Moral development: Advances in research and theory. New York: Praeger.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reynolds, S. J. (2006). A neurocognitive model of the ethical decision-making process: Implications for study and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(4), 737–748.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salvador, R., & Folger, R. G. (2009). Business ethics and the brain. Business Ethics Quarterly, 19(1), 1–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, H. A. (1987). Making management decisions: The role of intuition and emotion. Academy of Management Executive, 1(1), 57–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simpson, B. P. (2009). Wealth and income inequity: An economic and ethical analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 525–538.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Singer, A. E. (2010). Integrating ethics and strategy: A pragmatic approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 92, 479–491.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, T. (2000). Viable values: The study of life as the root and reward of morality. Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, T. (2006). The virtuous egoist: Ayn Rand’s normative ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sonenshein, S. (2007). The role of construction, intuition and justification in responding to ethical issues at work: The sensemaking-intuition model. Academy of Management Review, 32, 1022–1040.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tichy, N. M., & Bennis, W. G. (2007). Judgment: How winning leaders make great calls. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Toffler, B. L. (2003). Final accounting: Ambition, greed and the fall of Arthur Andersen. New York: Broadway Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Treviño, L., & Youngblood, S. (1990). Bad apples in bad barrels: A causal analysis of ethical decision-making behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 378–385.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woiceshyn, J. (2009). Lessons from “Good Minds”: How CEOs use intuition, analysis and guiding principles to make strategic decisions. Long Range Planning, 42(3), 277–319.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jaana Woiceshyn.

Appendix: A Summary of the Methodology and Findings of the Strategic Decision Making Study (Woiceshyn 2009)

Appendix: A Summary of the Methodology and Findings of the Strategic Decision Making Study (Woiceshyn 2009)

To identify CEOs who were effective thinkers, I asked nine oil industry experts (such as CEOs and investment bankers) in Calgary, Canada to name chief executive officers of successful oil companies whom they considered “good minds” or effective thinkers. Calgary is the location of the second-largest concentration of oil company headquarters in the world. The “oil patch” there is a tightly connected community where most players either know each other directly, or know of each other. I received 72 nominations, 32 of which had been suggested by two or more experts. I asked the 32 to participate in a study of strategic decision making. (The study also involved a comparison group of not-so-effective thinkers. For more details, see Woiceshyn (2009).) Sixteen of the effective CEOs agreed to participate. They either ran or had been recently running successful oil firms, and had a median industry experience of 24 years.

At the beginning of the interview sessions, all the CEOs were asked to read the same, realistic decision scenario where a CEO was given three strategic alternatives (see Woiceshyn 2009) and to think-out-loud how they would deal with it, in order to elicit their thinking processes. The interviews after the think-out-loud procedure included questions beyond the scenario, about the CEOs’ motivation, decision principles, outside interests and backgrounds. The sessions lasted for 90 min on average. Many were followed by phone calls to clarify issues or to ask further questions.

The interview transcripts were coded and then analyzed in several rounds. I first grouped together the interviewees’ comments by the question, then by the similarity of their content. I also conducted a similar analysis of the decision processes through which the CEOs handled the scenario. Patterns of using reason and intuition emerged from these categories of comments and analysis of processes, reinforced by each additional CEO’s interview. For example, it was directly observable from the interview transcripts that the CEOs used various “mid-range” principles. I integrated the mid-range principles into the general principles discussed in the report, and then re-analyzed the transcripts to validate the principles (e.g., by compiling quotations in which the principles were manifested and also by being alert to any evidence contradicting the principles). See Table 2 for examples of the ethical principles used by the CEOs. The notion of spiraling between the conscious and subconscious processing was induced from the effective CEO’s iterative pattern of analyzing the decision alternatives and applying principles.

Table 2 The moral principles applied by the effective CEOs

The model of decision making by integration by essentials and spiraling arose from the iterative contrasting of the transcripts and the summary tables of the effective CEOs with those of the not-so-effective CEOs. The most striking difference between the two groups of CEOs was the process labeled “integration by essentials.” In contrast to the effective CEOs, the latter group did not demonstrate integration: they did not identify many principles and made very few connections between ideas. Although the not-so-effective CEOs did some spiraling between the decision alternatives, they did not do it very systematically, nor did they apply principles to their decisions.

The study received a research ethics certification from my university’s research ethics review board. All participants gave their informed consent to participate.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Woiceshyn, J. A Model for Ethical Decision Making in Business: Reasoning, Intuition, and Rational Moral Principles. J Bus Ethics 104, 311–323 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0910-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0910-1

Keywords

Navigation