Abstract
We draw on Short’s work on Peirce’s theory of signs to propose a new general definition of interpretation. Short argues that Peirce’s semiotics rests on his naturalised teleology. Our proposal extends Short’s work by modifying his definition of interpretation so as to make it more generally applicable to putatively interpretative processes in biological systems. We use our definition as the basis of an account of different kinds of misinterpretation and we discuss some questions raised by the definition by reference to parallel problems in the field of teleosemantics. We propose that interpretative responses fulfilling the criteria of our definition may be made by relatively simple molecular entities and we suggest two specific empirical applications of the definition to experimental work in the field of origin of life research. Our wider aim is to suggest that a well formulated naturalistic definition of interpretation will allow a re-evaluation of the role of semiotic phenomena in biological systems, including the generation of empirically testable hypotheses.
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Notes
We include the parenthetical clause in order to exclude so-called ‘self-organising’ systems (more accurately, systems in which order arises spontaneously) from the definition of purpose. For example, Bénard cells (Q) exist because in certain circumstances that organisation of molecular motions has the general type of effect (P) of dissipating energy. This general type of effect, P, explains the selection of Q from among the other possible patterns of molecular motion that might arise randomly. But one would not normally say that dissipation of energy is the ‘purpose’ of a Bénard cell because P is constitutively related to Q. If the Bénard cell did not dissipate energy then it would not be a Bénard cell. Short’s way of putting this (expressed in our terminology) would be to say that in this example Q (the Bénard cell) is selected for its effect P (dissipation of energy), but not as a means to an end. In other words, in self-organising systems there is no distinction between means and ends.
Our terminology therefore shares the same etymological root as Millikan’s ‘proper functions’, though it is not directly related to or derived from Millikan’s usage (cf. Millikan 1984).
These three kinds of relation between X and O correspond respectively to C.S. Peirce’s distinction between indexes, icons and symbols (cf. Short 2007, pp. 214–222), though it is not our purpose here to defend Peirce’s taxonomy of signs.
A standard illustration of interpretative capabilities in microbes has been a ‘hungry’ bacterium (Kauffman 2000, 111). However, the best-studied form of bacterial chemotaxis involves a biased random walk arising from reduction of the rate of tumbling (which results in random redirection) when attractant concentration is increasing. Although this could in principle be shown to fit the definition of interpretation the involvement of a negative rather than positive response to attractant slightly complicates the example as an illustration.
We exclude here the case where the amoeba is physically damaged and therefore malfunctioning, as our interest is in its semiotic capabilities when functioning normally.
It would be an R-level error if the attractant gradient were exactly the same as in the case where the bacterium was accessible and digestible. If the inaccessible, indigestible, or toxic bacterium gave rise to a different attractant gradient, which the amoeba was unable to distinguish from that of the accessible and digestible bacterium, the response would be a Q-level error.
It is important to note that all of the criteria discussed above for promising proto-life are being taken in our thinking to precede the existence of ‘representational information’ of the sort that DNA is often taken to constitute in a modern cell. Much confusion has arisen in the literature through assuming that such information or coding must be the earliest, or even an early, step in the emergence of life, or that such representation is the minimum criterion for semiosis. See Küppers (1990) for a typical study; also Schneider (2000). Insisting on the importance of coding tends to mean invoking a complex nucleic acid-protein interaction at an early stage; rejection of coding has often meant the rejection of all early roles for nucleic acid. Our definition of interpretation allows for the possibility of an early role for nucleic acid sequences without imputing to these any property of ‘coding’.
As Daley et al. (2002) imply, such a property would therefore be expected to enable systems possessing it to supersede more limited systems. It is possible that the property of interpretation could be lost in this process. But, again, interpretation would be expected to give systems capable of work-cycles a great selective advantage over their non-interpretative equivalents, so we would expect that interpretation would rapidly re-evolve even if it had been temporarily lost.
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Dr. T. L. Short for a generous exchange of views and various helpful personal communications. We also thank Drs Philip Clayton, Terrence Deacon, Niels Gregersen, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Stuart Kauffman, Niles Lehman, Robert Ulanowicz, Bruce Weber and Mark Wynn for very helpful consultations on this material, and anonymous reviewers of an original version of the article for helpful criticisms. We are very glad to acknowledge the support of the Science and Transcendence Advanced Research Series 2007, 2008 and 2009.
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Robinson, A., Southgate, C. A general definition of interpretation and its application to origin of life research. Biol Philos 25, 163–181 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-009-9188-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-009-9188-4