Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Difference mechanisms: explaining variation with mechanisms

  • Published:
Biology & Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Philosophers of science have developed an account of causal-mechanical explanation that captures regularity, but this account neglects variation. In this article I amend the philosophy of mechanisms to capture variation. The task is to explicate the relationship between regular causal mechanisms responsible for individual development and causes of variation responsible for variation in populations. As it turns out, disputes over this relationship have rested at the heart of the nature–nurture debate. Thus, an explication of the relationship between regular causal mechanisms and causes of variation and between individual development and variation offers both the necessary amendment to the philosophy of mechanisms and the resources to mediate the dispute.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For instance, there is a difference in the way in which the parts of a mechanism are understood to behave. This behavior has been characterized as a function (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005), an activity (Machamer et al. 2000; Machamer 2004), an interaction (Glennan 2002; Woodward 2002), and an interactivity (Tabery 2004). See Tabery (2004) for an analysis of this difference and the relationship between the various accounts.

  2. Although I am highlighting Craver’s work here, this focus on the causal mechanisms responsible for regularity in a phenomenon is common throughout the philosophy of mechanism literature. I thank Bill Bechtel for capturing this trend as a focus on Platonic forms.

  3. Brett Calcott (2009) offers an amendment in the same spirit with his discussion of lineage explanations. My interest here is in amending the mechanical program to capture variation across populations. Calcott amends the mechanical program to capture evolutionary changes that mechanisms undergo over time.

  4. For a textbook-style orientation to this approach, see Plomin et al. (2008).

  5. For histories of the reaction norm concept, see Gottesman (2008), Griffiths and Tabery (2007), and Sarkar (1999).

  6. Downes (2009) provides a useful overview of Lewontin’s arguments and their impact on the philosophy of science.

  7. The appeal to different levels of analysis is not unique to the nature–nurture debate. There is a long history of uniting different explanation-seeking questions with different explanatory levels. And appealing to these different levels as a means to defend against cross-disciplinary criticism is also by no means unique to the nature–nurture debate. Mitchell (2003) assesses a similar debate over the origins of the female orgasm and introduces the concept of “isolationist pluralism” as a characterization of attempts to isolate different research traditions at different levels of analysis.

  8. Counterfactual dependence, for Woodward, is understood with the closely related concepts of intervention and invariance. An intervention consists of an idealized experimental manipulation of the value of some variable, thereby determining if it results in a change in the value of the outcome. So the counterfactuals are formulated in such a way that they show how the value of the outcome would change under the interventions that change the value of a variable; that is, they are formulated to show how the difference-makers make their difference. Invariance, then, is a characterization of the relationship between variables (or a variable and an outcome) under interventions on Woodward’s account. When there is an invariant relationship between a variable and an outcome, then that relationship is potentially exploitable for manipulation, and because of this it is a causal relationship.

  9. I use “mechanism sketch” in the sense of Machamer et al. (2000). As they explain, “A sketch is an abstraction for which bottom out entities and activities cannot (yet) be supplied or which contains gaps in its stages….A sketch thus serves to indicate what further work needs to be done…” (ibid, p. 18). My account of the relationship between the regular causal mechanisms responsible for individual development and the causes of variation responsible for variation is not wedded to the veracity of this particular mechanism sketch of depression; I simply use it to display what the elucidation of a difference mechanism looks like.

  10. For a discussion of how cases of G × E resulting in a change of rank are often mischaracterized as evincing a “genetic predisposition”, see Tabery (2009a, Forthcoming).

  11. Wahlsten (1990, 2000) reaches a similar conclusion in his methodological discussions of the biometric tradition; the analysis of difference mechanisms offered here provides a metaphysical foundation for that methodological contribution.

References

  • Beatty J (1995) The evolutionary contingency thesis. In: Wolters G, Lennox JG (eds) Concepts, theories, and rationality in the biological sciences. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp 45–81

    Google Scholar 

  • Bechtel W, Abrahamsen A (2005) Explanation: a mechanist alternative. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 36:421–441. doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.010

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bechtel W, Richardson RC (1993) Discovering complexity: decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Bengel D, Murphy DL, Andrews AM et al (1998) Altered brain serotonin homeostasis and locomotor insensitivity to 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“Ecstacy”) in serotonin transporter-deficient mice. Mol Pharmacol 53:649–655

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann U (2000) In your mind’s eye: speculations on the neurobiology of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR). New Ther 9

  • Block N (1995) How heritability misleads about race. Cognition 56:99–128. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00678-R

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block N, Dworkin G (1976) IQ, heritability and inequality. In: Block Ned, Dworkin Gerald (eds) The IQ controversy. Pantheon, New York, pp 410–540

    Google Scholar 

  • Bouchard TJ, Segal NL (1985) Environment and IQ. In: Wolman BB (ed) Handbook of intelligence: theories, measurements, and applications. Wiley, New York, pp 391–464

    Google Scholar 

  • Calcott B (2009) Lineage explanations: explaining how biological mechanisms change. Br J Philos Sci 60:51--78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caspi A, Moffitt TE (2006) Gene-environment interactions in psychiatry: joining forces with neuroscience. Nat Rev Neurosci 7:583–590. doi:10.1038/nrn1925

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caspi A, Sugden K, Moffitt TE et al (2003) Influence of life stress on depression: moderation by a polymorphism in the 5-HTT gene. Science 301:386–389. doi:10.1126/science.1083968

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Craver CF (2001) Structures of scientific theories. In: Machamer PK, Silberstein M (eds) Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Craver CF (2007) Explaining the brain. Oxford University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cronbach LJ, Meehl PE (1955) Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychol Bull 52:281–302. doi:10.1037/h0040957

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Daniels N (1974) IQ, heritability, and human nature. PSA: proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association, pp 143–180

  • Darden L (2006) Reasoning in biological discoveries. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Downes S (2009) Heredity and heritability. In: Zalta EN (ed) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/heredity/>

  • Feldman MW, Lewontin RC (1975) The heritability hang-up. Science 190:1163–1168. doi:10.1126/science.1198102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fuller T, Sarkar S, Crews D (2005) The use of norms of reaction to analyze genotypic and environmental influences on behavior in mice and rats. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 29:445–456. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2004.12.005

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glennan S (2002) Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philos Sci 69:S342–S353. doi:10.1086/341857

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gottesman II (2008) Milestones in the history of behavioral genetics: participant observer. Acta Psychol Sin 40:1042–1050

    Google Scholar 

  • Gottlieb G (2003) On making behavioral genetics truly developmental. Hum Dev 46:337–355. doi:10.1159/000073306

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Griffiths PE, Tabery J (2007) Behavioral genetics and development: historical and conceptual causes of controversy. N Ideas Psychol 26:332–352. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2007.07.016

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hariri AR, Holmes A (2006) Genetics of emotional regulation: the role of the serotonin transporter in neural function. Trends Cogn Sci 10:182–191. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.02.011

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hariri AR, Mattay VS, Tessitore A et al (2002) Serotonin transporter genetic variation and the response of the human amygdala. Science 297:400–403. doi:10.1126/science.1071829

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hume D (1993) An enquiry concerning human understanding. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen AR (1973) Educability and group differences. Harper and Row Publishers, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan JM (2000) The limits and lies of human genetic research. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kendler KS (2005) Toward a philosophical structure for psychiatry. Am J Psychiatry 162:433–440. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.162.3.433

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Layzer D (1972) Science or superstition? (a physical scientist looks at the IQ controversy). Cognition 1:265–299. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(72)90022-4

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leonardo ED, Hen Rene (2006) Genetics of affective and anxiety disorders. Annu Rev Psychol 57:117–137. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lesch K-P, Bengel D, Heils A et al (1996) Association of anxiety-related traits with a polymorphism in the serotonin transporter gene regulatory region. Science 274:1527–1531. doi:10.1126/science.274.5292.1527

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D (1973) Causation. J Philos 70:556–567. doi:10.2307/2025310

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewontin RC (1974) The analysis of variance and the analysis of causes. Am J Hum Genet 26:400–411

    Google Scholar 

  • Little D (1990) Varieties of social explanation: an introduction to the philosophy of social science. Westview Press, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Longino H (2001) What do we measure when we measure aggression? Stud Hist Philos Sci A 32:685–704. doi:10.1016/S0039-3681(01)00020-6

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Machamer PK (2004) Activities and causation: the metaphysics and epistemology of mechanisms. Int Stud Philos Sci 18:27–39. doi:10.1080/02698590412331289242

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Machamer PK, Darden L, Craver CF (2000) Thinking about mechanisms. Philos Sci 67:1–25. doi:10.1086/392759

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell SD (2003) Biological complexity and integrative pluralism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Oftedal G (2005) Heritability and causation. Philos Sci 72:699–709. doi:10.1086/508126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oyama S (2000) Causal democracy and causal contributions in developmental systems theory. Philos Sci 67:S332–S347. doi:10.1086/392830

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pezawas L, Meyer-Lindenberg A, Drabant EM et al (2005) 5-HTTLPR polymorphism impacts human cingulate-amygdala interactions: a genetic susceptibility mechanism for depression. Nat Neurosci 8:828–834. doi:10.1038/nn1463

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plomin R, DeFries JC, Loehlin J (1977) Genotype-environment interaction and correlation in the analysis of human behavior. Psychol Bull 84:309–322. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.84.2.309

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plomin R, DeFries JC, McClearn GE, McGuffin P (2008) Behavioral genetics. Worth Publishers, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Robert JS (2004) Embryology, epigenesis, and evolution: taking development seriously. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Rutter M (2006) Genes and behavior: nature–nurture interplay explained. Blackwell, Malden

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar S (1998) Genetics and reductionism. Cambridge Universitiy Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar S (1999) From the reaktionsnorm to the adaptive norm: the norm of reaction, 1909–1960. Biol Philos 14:235–252. doi:10.1023/A:1006690502648

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schaffner KF (1993) Discovery and explanation in biology and medicine. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffner KF (2006) Reduction: the cheshire cat problem and a return to roots. Synthese 151:377–402. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9031-2

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sesardic N (2005) Making sense of heritability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Surbey MK (1994) Discussion: why expect a horse to fly? reply to wahlsten. Can Psychol 35:261–264. doi:10.1037/0708-5591.35.3.261

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tabery JG (2004) Synthesizing activities and interactions in the concept of a mechanism. Philos Sci 71:1–15. doi:10.1086/381409

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tabery J (2007) Biometric and developmental gene-environment interactions: looking back, moving forward. Dev Psychopathol 19:961–976. doi:10.1017/S0954579407000478

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tabery J (2008) R. A. Fisher, Lancelot Hogben, and the origin(s) of genotype-environment interaction. J Hist Biol 41:717–761. doi:10.1007/s10739-008-9155-y

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tabery J (2009a) From a genetic predisposition to an interactive predisposition: rethinking the ethical implications of screening for gene-environment interactions. J Med Philos 34:27–48. doi:10.1093/jmp/jhn039

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tabery J (2009b) Making sense of the nature–nurture debate (review of neven sesardic, making sense of heritability). Biol Philos. Available online 4 Feb 2009 (in press)

  • Tabery J (Forthcoming) Interactive predispositions. Philos Sci

  • Vreeke GJ (2000) Nature, nurture and the future of the analysis of variance. Hum Dev 43:32–45. doi:10.1159/000022654

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wahlsten D (1990) Insensitivity of the analysis of variance to heredity-environment interaction. Behav Brain Sci 13:109–161

    Google Scholar 

  • Wahlsten D (2000) Analysis of variance in the service of interactionism. Hum Dev 43:46–50. doi:10.1159/000022655

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Waters CK (2007) Causes that make a difference. J Philos 104:551–579

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward J (2002) What is a mechanism? A counterfactual account. Philos Sci 69:S336–S378. doi:10.1086/341279

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodward J (2003) Making things happen. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

    James Tabery

Authors
  1. James Tabery
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to James Tabery.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Tabery, J. Difference mechanisms: explaining variation with mechanisms. Biol Philos 24, 645–664 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-009-9161-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-009-9161-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation