The “evolutionary argument” and the metaphilosophy of commonsense

Abstract

Recently in these pages it has been argued that a relatively straightforward version of an old argument based on evolutionary biology and psychology can be employed to support the view that innate ideas are a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge. While sympathetic to the view that the “evolutionary argument” is pregnant with philosophical implications, I show in this paper how it needs to be developed and deployed in order to avoid serious philosophical difficulties and unnecessary complications. I sketch a revised version of the evolutionary argument, place it in a new context, and show that this version in this context is not vulnerable to the standard criticisms levelled against arguments of this general type. The philosophical import of this version of the argument lies not in any metaphysical conclusions it sanctions directly, but in the support it lends to the metaphilosophy of commonsense.

Appendix: What counts as a commonsense belief?

It is important to recognise that “commonsense” is something of a term of art. A commonsense belief is not just any belief accepted pre-theoretically by virtually everyone and challenged by virtually nobody, although most commonsense beliefs fit this bill. Commonsense beliefs, in the sense which I use the term here, are those beliefs regarding the nature of things which are presupposed by ordinary everyday beliefs. Another way to put this is to say that commonsense philosophers are most interested in the elements of the conceptual scheme which lies behind the views and actions of the ordinary person, a conceptual scheme of which the ordinary person may be totally unaware. With these remarks in mind the following list of beliefs can serve as examples of commonsense beliefs as that term is employed here. The list is meant to be illustrative but not exhaustive:

• 1. There are in the Universe an enormous number of material objects (e.g. our bodies, other people, animals, plants, stones, mountains, rivers, seas, planets, tables, chairs, etc.)

• 2. Human beings have minds (mental acts, acts of consciousness). We see, hear, feel, remember, imagine, think, believe, desire, dislike, will, love, etc.

• 3. All material objects are located in space (located at a distance from each other).

• 4. Mental acts are attached to – contained within – certain kinds of bodies (human bodies and those of the higher animals).

• 5. Mental acts are ontologically dependent upon bodies.

• 6. Most material objects have no acts of consciousness attached to them.

• 7. Material objects can and do exist when we are not conscious of them.

• 8. All objects and acts of consciousness are in time.

• 9. We know (1)–(8) to be true.

• 10. We can have knowledge of the mind independent properties of objects within the limits of our cognitive capacities.

• 11. Words have relatively clear meanings, and we can use them to speak about objects in the world.

• 12. Truth is a relationship of correspondence between beliefs and states of affairs in the world.

• 13. The relationship of causation is a real feature of the world.

• 14. I think, I remember, I reason, and, in general, I really perform all those operations of the mind of which I am conscious.

• 15. My well functioning memory is reliable if not infallible when concerned with recent events.

• 16. By attentive reflection a man can have a clear and certain knowledge of the operations of his own mind.

• 17. All the thoughts I am conscious of, or remember, are the thoughts of one and the same thinking principle, which I call myself, or my mind.

• 18. There are some things which cannot exist by themselves, but must be in something else, as qualities, or attributes.

• 19. In most operations of the mind there is an object distinct from the operation itself. (e.g. I cannot see without seeing something.)

[1–9 taken from Moore (2002); 10–13 taken from Searle (1999); 14–19 taken from Reid (1983)]