Abstract
While considerable research has examined how genetic explanations for behavior impact assessments of moral responsibility, results across studies have been inconsistent. Some studies suggest that genetic accounts diminish ascriptions of responsibility, but others show no effect. Nonetheless, conclusions from behavior genetics are increasingly mobilized on behalf of defendants in court, suggesting a widespread intuition that this sort of information is relevant to assessments of blameworthiness. In this paper, we consider two sorts of reasons why this kind of intuition, if it exists, is not consistently revealed in empirical studies. On the one hand, people may have complex and internally conflicting intuitions about the relationship between behavior genetics and moral responsibility. On the other hand, it may be that people are motivated to think about the role of genetics in behavior differently depending on the moral valence of the actions in question.
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08 September 2018
The original version of this article unfortunately contained a few mistakes in the Introduction section.
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Funding
This study was funded by the Genetics and Human Agency Grant from the John Templeton Foundation and the Center for Research on the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Psychiatric, Neurologic and Behavioral Genetics, NHGRI (Grant Number 1P50HG007257).
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Paul S. Appelbaum declares he has no conflict of interest. Matthew S. Lebowitz declares he has no conflict of interest. Kathryn Tabb declares she has no conflict of interest.
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Tabb, K., Lebowitz, M.S. & Appelbaum, P.S. Behavioral Genetics and Attributions of Moral Responsibility. Behav Genet 49, 128–135 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10519-018-9916-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10519-018-9916-0