Abstract
Relevance of premises to conclusion can be explicated through Toulmin’s notion of warrant, understood as an inference rule, albeit not necessarily formal. A normative notion of relevance requires the warrant to be reliable. To determine reliability, we propose a fourfold classification of warrants into a priori, empirical, institutional, and evaluative, with further subdivisions possible. This classification has its ancestry in classical rhetoric and recent epistemology. Distinctive to each type of warrant is the mode by which such connections are intuitively discovered and the grounds on which we ultimately justify them. The classification of warrants is thus epistemic. We illustrate the difference by contrasting empirical physical with institutional intuition, and argue for the advantages of this approach over Toulmin’s conception of field dependence.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
A. W. Burks (1951) ArticleTitle‘The Logic of Causal Propositions’ Mind 60 363–382
C. A. J. Coady (1992) Testimony: A Philosophical Study Clarendon Press Oxford
J. B. Freeman (1992) ArticleTitle‘Relevance, Warrants, Backing, Inductive Support’ Argumentation 6 219–235 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00154327
J. B. Freeman (2000) ArticleTitle‘What Types of Statements Are There?’ Argumentation 14 135–157 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1007846431353
J. B. Freeman (2005) Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem Cambridge University Press Cambridge
D. Hitchcock (1985) ArticleTitle‘Enthymematic Arguments’ Informal Logic 7 83–97
R. H. Johnson (1996) The Rise of Informal Logic Vale Press Newport News, VA
H. Kornblith (1993) Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology The MIT Press Cambridge, MA
A. N. Kruger (1975) ArticleTitle‘The Nature of Controversial Statements’ Philosophy & Rhetoric 8 137–158
D. L. Medin A. Ortony (1989) Comments on Part I: Psychological Essentialism S. Vosniadou A. Ortony (Eds) Similarity and Analogical Reasoning Cambridge University Press Cambridge 179–195
J. R. Searle (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language Cambridge University Press Cambridge
J. R. Searle (1979) Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts Cambridge University Press Cambridge
S. Toulmin (1958) The Uses of Argument Cambridge University Press Cambridge
S. Toulmin R. Rieke A. Janik (1984) An Introduction to Reasoning EditionNumber2 Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and Collier Macmillan Publishers New York, London
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Freeman, J.B. Systematizing Toulmin’s Warrants: An Epistemic Approach. Argumentation 19, 331–346 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-005-4420-0
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-005-4420-0