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On repeated stackelberg security game with the cooperative human behavior model for wildlife protection

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Abstract

Inspired by successful deployments of Stackelberg Security Game in real life, researchers are working hard to optimize the game models to make them more practical. Recent security game work on wildlife protection makes a step forward by taking the possible cooperation among attackers into consideration. However, it models attackers to have complete rationality, which is not always possible in practice given they are human beings. We aim to tackle attackers’ bounded rationality in the complicated, cooperation-enabled and multi-round security game for wildlife protection. Specifically, we construct a repeated Stackelberg game, and propose a novel adaptive human behavior model for attackers based on it. Despite generating defender’s optimal strategy requires to solve a non-linear and non-convex optimization problem, we are able to propose an efficient algorithm that approximately solve this problem. We perform extensive real-life experiments, and results from over 25,000 game plays show our solution effectively helps the defender to deal with attackers who might cooperate.

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Correspondence to Sheng Zhong.

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This work was supported in part by National Key R&D Program of China (2018YFB1004301), NSFC-61321491, NSFC-61425024, NSFC-61872176, and NSFC-61872179.

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Wang, B., Zhang, Y., Zhou, ZH. et al. On repeated stackelberg security game with the cooperative human behavior model for wildlife protection. Appl Intell 49, 1002–1015 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-018-1307-y

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