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Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting

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Abstract

In a combinatorial auction, a set of items is for sale, and agents can bid on subsets of these items. In a voting setting, the agents decide among a set of alternatives by having each agent rank all the alternatives. Many of the key research issues in these two domains are similar. The aim of this paper is to give a convenient side-by-side comparison that will clarify the relation between the domains, and serve as a guide to future research.

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  1. Department of Computer Science, Duke University, Durham, NC, 27708, USA

    Vincent Conitzer

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Correspondence to Vincent Conitzer.

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This paper corresponds to an invited talk in the session on Computation and Social Choice at the Tenth International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (ISAIM-08). An early version of this paper appeared in the informal electronic proceedings of ISAIM-08. The author is supported by an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and by NSF under award numbers IIS-0812113 and CAREER-0953756.

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Conitzer, V. Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting. Ann Math Artif Intell 58, 239–259 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y

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