Abstract
This paper examines the strategic interaction of n portfolio managers with relative performance concerns. We characterize the unique constant Nash equilibrium and derive some compelling results. Surprisingly, in equilibrium, more risk tolerant players do not generally take riskier positions than less risk tolerant players. We derive sufficient conditions under which this relation does hold. We also examine the effects of adding new players to the game on the equilibrium, and look at the equilibrium in the limiting case as the number of players goes to infinity. We show that for a symmetric population, the equilibrium strategy of the players converges pointwise to some limiting equilibrium policy.
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Notes
Indeed there is a (slightly irreverent) quote by the topologist R. H. Bing which conveys something similar to what we are saying here: “Dimension 4 is the most difficult dimension. It is too old to spank, the way we might deal with the little dimensions 1, 2, and 3; but it is also too young to reason with, the way we deal with the grown-up dimensions 5 and higher.” Cannon (2011)
Recall that the natural filtration generated by a Brownian motion is \(F^{W}(t)= \sigma \left( \left\{ W_{s} | 0 \le s \le t \right\} \right) \), \(\forall t\in [0,T]\).
Henceforth, we omit the word constant and just write Nash equilibrium.
A portfolio strategy is admissible if it belongs to the set \({\mathcal {P}}\), where \({\mathcal {P}}\) consists of self-financing \({\mathcal {F}}\)-progressively measurable real-valued processes \((\pi _{t})_{t \in [0,T]}\) which satisfy \({\mathbb {E}}\int _{0}^{T}|\pi _{t}|^{2}dt < \infty \).
Detailed in “Appendix A.2”.
In this case, this assumption is without loss of generality.
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This paper has benefited greatly from helpful comments and suggestions by an anonymous referee, Hassan Afrouzi, Svetlana Boyarchenko, Gleb Domnenko, Rosemary Hopcroft, Cooper Howes, Joseph Whitmeyer, Thomas Wiseman, Thaleia Zariphopoulou, and seminar audiences at the University of Texas at Austin, the 2017 Texas Economic Theory Camp, and the 2017 Stony Brook Game Theory Conference. All remaining errors are, regrettably, my own.
Appendix A
Appendix A
1.1 A.1 Theorem 1 proof
We proceed by considering WLOG player 1’s problem. First, apply the Dynamic Programming Principle:
where for convenience we write only the first argument of player 1’s utility function instead of \(u_{iT}(X_{iT}, \times _{j \ne i} R_{ijT})\).
In infinitesimal form, \(\max _{\pi }{\mathbb {E}}(dV) = 0\). By the Principle of Optimality, V has zero drift at \(\pi ^{*}\). Now, we use It\({\hat{o}}\)’s Lemma:
and substitute into (A1) to obtain
At the optimum, the drift is equal to 0 and so we have:
The HJB Equation (A2) is:
We take the First Order Condition of the HJB Equation (A2):
Rearranging, obtain:
Now suppose
For computational convenience, set
Thus, (A4) can be written as:
From (A5), we obtain:
Substituting (A6) into (A3) we obtain:
It remains to verify that our guess does indeed satisfy the HJB equation. Revisiting the HJB Equation,
Substitute in (A6)
Thus, f satisfies
where
Using the boundary condition of \(f(T) = 1\) we solve the differential Eq. (A7), yielding \(f(t) = e^{\xi _{1}(1-\gamma _{1})(T-t)}\). Thus, wealth is given as:
1.2 A.2 Equation (9) derivation
From Eq. (8) we have
We sum up these equations over all players i as follows:
Recall that \(\xi = \sum _{i}\pi _{i}^{*}\). This allows us to obtain
1.3 A.3 Lemma 1 proof
Evidently, it suffices to show that \(\xi \) is strictly locally decreasing in \(\gamma _{i}\) for all i. Recall that \(\xi = A^{-1}B\), where A and B are as defined in Eq. (9). Then, using the chain rule,
Define \(x_{i}\) as \(x_{i} :=\gamma _{i}(1 + \rho \theta ) - \rho \theta \) and note that \(\frac{\partial {A}}{\partial {\gamma _{i}}} = -\frac{\rho \theta }{x_{i}^{2}}\). Observe that \(\frac{\partial {\xi }}{\partial {\gamma _{i}}} \le 0\) if and only if
Define \(\iota (\pmb {\gamma })\) as
Then for arbitrary i,
Thus, for all i, \(\iota \) is constant in \(\gamma _{i}\). Accordingly, we may simply substitute in any value of \(\gamma _{i}\). For convenience, substitute in \(\gamma _{i} = 1\) for all i. From (A8),
which clearly must hold. \(\square \)
1.4 A.4 Lemma 2 proof
We prove this result by contradiction. Let \(\gamma _{i} > \frac{\rho \theta }{1 + \rho \theta }\) for all i and suppose that \(g(\pmb {\gamma }) \le 0\). That is, \(g(\pmb {\gamma }) \le 0\)
Define \(\psi (\gamma _{i})\) as
Then,
which is continuous and strictly greater than 0 for \(\gamma _{i} \in \left( \frac{\rho \theta }{1 + \rho \theta }, \infty \right) \). Now we examine \(\psi (\gamma _{i})\) in the limit:
Thus,
Or, \(1 < \rho \theta (n-1)\), which is clearly false. \(\square \)
1.5 A.5 Proposition 2 proof
If the parameters are completely symmetric across all players, then \(\pi ^{*} = \pi _{i}^{*}\) for all i and
First, note that the denominator, \(\gamma - \rho \theta (n-1)(\gamma -1)\) is strictly greater than 0 for permissible values of the parameters. Then, \(\frac{\partial {\pi ^{*}}}{\partial {\gamma }} < 0\) if and only if \(\rho \theta (n-1) -1 < 0\), which clearly must hold. Similarly, \(\frac{\partial {\pi ^{*}}}{\partial {{\mathfrak {s}}}} > 0\) if and only if \(\sigma > 0\). Likewise, \(\frac{\partial {\pi ^{*}}}{\partial {\theta }}>\)\((<)\) 0 if and only if \(\rho (n-1)(\gamma -1)>\)\((<)\) 0 if and only if \((\gamma -1)>\)\((<)\) 0; and \(\frac{\partial {\pi ^{*}}}{\partial {\rho }}>\)\((<)\) 0 if and only if \(\theta (n-1)(\gamma -1)>\)\((<)\) 0 if and only if \((\gamma -1)>\)\((<)\) 0. \(\square \)
1.6 A.6 Lemma 3 proof
Consider the situation with n players, indexed by i. Without loss of generality, suppose \(\gamma _{n} < \gamma _{i}\) for all \(i \ne n\). We prove by contradiction: suppose that in equilibrium there is some j such that \(\pi _{j}^{*} \ge \pi _{n}^{*}\).
Since we are at equilibrium, \(A \varvec{\pi }^{*} = {\mathbf {b}}\). For convenience, we divide both sides by the scalars \(\rho \), \(\theta \) and \(\sigma ^{2}\) and so we may rewrite the relationship as:
Thus, we have
Combining,
The set \(\left\{ \pi ^{*}_{i}\right\} _{i \ne j,n}\) is discrete and finite and thus compact. Therefore, it must have a set of maximal elements, one of whose members is WLOG \(\pi _{m}^{*}\). Then, from our supposition above and (A10),
Rearranging, we obtain \(\pi _{j}^{*}\frac{1 - \rho \theta }{\rho \theta (n-2)} \le \pi _{m}^{*}\), whence we obtain \(\pi _{m}^{*} > \pi _{j}^{*} \ge \pi _{n}^{*}\). Just as we have Eq. (A10), we can also obtain in analogous fashion:
Suppose \(\pi _{j}^{*} \in \max _{i \ne m,n} \left\{ \pi ^{*}_{i}\right\} \). We must have
Rearranging, we obtain \(\pi _{m}^{*}\frac{1 - \rho \theta }{\rho \theta (n-2)} \le \pi _{j}^{*}\), whence we obtain \(\pi _{j}^{*}> \pi _{m}^{*} > \pi _{j}^{*}\), which is obviously a contradiction. Thus \(\pi _{j}^{*} \notin \max _{i \ne m,n} \left\{ \pi ^{*}_{i}\right\} \) and so we must pick another element of that set, say \(\pi _{q}^{*}\). We must have
Rearranging, we obtain \(\pi _{m}^{*}\frac{1 - \rho \theta }{\rho \theta (n-2)} \le \pi _{q}^{*}\), whence we obtain \(\pi _{q}^{*} > \pi _{m}^{*}\).
But this contradicts our our statement above, that \(\pi _{m}^{*}\) is a maximal element of \(\left\{ \pi ^{*}_{i}\right\} _{i \ne j,n}\). We have generated a contradiction, and since j indexed an arbitrary player, we conclude that if \(\gamma _{n} < \gamma _{i}\)\(\forall i \ne n\), then \(\pi _{n}^{*} > \pi _{i}^{*}\)\(\forall i \ne n\).
The final part of this lemma, the case where \(\gamma _{n}\) is not uniquely minimal, and there exists some \(\gamma _{k} = \gamma _{n}\) holds trivially: clearly \(\pi _{k} = \pi _{n}\). \(\square \)
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Whitmeyer, M. Relative performance concerns among investment managers. Ann Finance 15, 205–231 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-019-00343-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-019-00343-2