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Strategic considerations in the US–China relationship and the role of European soft power

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Abstract

This paper analyses strategic considerations within the conceptual, the policy and the systemic dimension of US–Sino relations. Furthermore, the role of the EU’s soft power in the context of US–China relations will be assessed. It will be argued that current US–China relations are mainly a function of the current US foreign policy towards China, which doesn’t take into account that an engagement policy towards China needs to be paralleled by an engagement policy towards the East Asian region. A functional equivalent of the EU’s soft power and its approach of bilateral and multilateral engagement of East Asian actors is a missing element in US–China relations. The thinking on China affairs in the USA can be broadly structured into two different schools of thought. On the one side there are those who favour an engagement policy vis-à-vis China. The engagement school argues that bilateral and multilateral cooperation with China needs to be intensified. Traditionally members of this school are found in the Department of State and the Bureau of the US Trade Representative. On the other side there are those who think of China as a threat that needs to be contained. The politicians and experts that belong to the threat school (e.g. in the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute) emphasize their fears of China’s future role on the regional and global level. Though China has supported the US’s “war on terrorism” after the attacks of 9/11, Beijing’s increasing military budget, its neglect of non-proliferation agreements (e.g. in its relations with Pakistan) and its behaviour within the Six-Party Talks are taken as examples of the China threat. Security policies do not solely determine the relationship between the USA and China. The US China policy is a function of both the US’s economic and security interests. This explains why Washington follows a dual policy of simultaneous engagement and containment, i.e. a policy of hedged engagement. But the current state of affair of the Sino–US relationship does not reflect the rise of China as a de facto hegemon of an East Asian community. It is the inherent danger of the current US China policy that the missing regional component in US–China relations could facilitate the formation of a fortress Asia. Since Beijing holds the key to Asian regionalism, China should be the main target of European soft power in Asia by exporting the principles of regionalism and multilateralism to Asia. To what extent the EU and its model of intraregional cooperation and integration can influence the objective and trajectory of Asian regionalism will demonstrate partly the extent of Europe’s soft power in the international system.

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Notes

  1. See: Volume I of this Study, Annex I: Focus Group Questionnaire. A majority of the experts also holds the view that the Chinese-Japanese relationship is most important.

  2. See: Sebastian Bersick, Auf dem Weg in eine neue Weltordnung? Zur Politik der interregionalen Beziehungen am Beispiel des ASEM-Prozesses [Towards a New World Order? On the Politics of Interregional Relations: The Example of the ASEM process] Baden-Baden 2004.

  3. Jonathan D Pollack, ‘The United States and Asia in 2004. Unfinished Business.’, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 45, Issue 1 (2005), pp. 1–13.

  4. Heinrich Kreft, ‘Die USA – Stabilitätsanker für Asien?’ [The United States – The Security Linchpin for Asia?], Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen, no. 148 (2004/2), p. 36.

  5. Ralph Cossa, ‘US Security Strategy in Asia and the Prospects for an Asian Regional Security Regime’, in: Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), p. 64.

  6. Jisi Wang, ‘China’s Changing Role in Asia’, Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition), vol. 4 (3/2003), p. 73.

  7. See also Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Future of U.S.-China Relations. Is Conflict Inevitable?’, in: International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45.

  8. Henry Kissinger, ‘Conflict is not an option’, IHT, 09.06.05, p. 9.

  9. Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review Report’, February 6, 2006, p. 29. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.htm.

  10. Robert B. Zoellick “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?, Remarks to National Committee on U.S-China Relations, 21.09.05, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm. download 22.09.05. For an analysis of Zoellick’s assessment see: NBR Analysis (The National Bureau of Asian Research), Vol. 16, No 4, December 2005.

  11. See: Bill Gertz, ‘China’s emergence as military power splits strategists on threat to U.S.’ The Washington Post, 07.02.06.

  12. Joseph Nye, ‘Soft Power: the Means to Succeed in World Politics’, New York 2004, p. X.

  13. For the following see: Michael Kolkmann, ‘Die China-Politik der USA. Konzepte-Erfahrungen-Perspektiven’ [The China policy of the USA. Concepts-experiences-perspectives.], SWP-Studie, Berlin, April 2005, 17 pp.

  14. Interview of the author, 11.03.05 in Washington D.C.

  15. “(…) you [Wen Jiabao] have been candid, constructive, and you have sought cooperative relationships, and that is precisely what we seek with China: a candid, constructive and cooperative relationship.” Remarks of Secretary Colin L. Powell at Dinner Honoring Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Washington, DC 08.12.2003.

  16. See: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17.09.2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html.

  17. The following interview information will be, for reasons of discretion, anonymized. The interviews have been conducted by the author in March 2005 in Washington D.C.

  18. Paul Blustein, ‘Trade Nominee Vows Action on China’, Washington Post Com, 22.04.05; Page E01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8103-2005Apr21.html, download: 16.06.05.

  19. According to Goldstein and Lardy “China’s real effective exchange rate has depreciated by 10% since February 2002, at the same time as it has run ever-larger current acount surpluses”. See: FT, 27.04.05, p. 12.

  20. FT, 11/12.06.05, p. 1.

  21. Charles E. Schumer / Lindsey Graham, ‘Free The yuan!’, in: IHT, 09.06.05, p. 9.

  22. The currency of a country with a trade deficit falls in value, causing imports to shrink (because they become more expensive) and its exports to rise (because they become cheaper).

  23. Charles E. Schumer / Lindsey Graham, op. cit.

  24. See: Nicolas Lardy, “China: The Great New Economic Challenge?”, in: C. Fred Bergsten (ed.) The United States and the World Economy, Washington D.C. 2005; 125 pp.

  25. Nicolas Lardy, op. cit., pp. 126–127.

  26. In the following I will concentrate on the example of the cross Taiwan strait relations.

  27. Interview of the author in Washington D.C., 11.03.15.

  28. See for the following: Non-published paper by Evian Medeiros, RAND Cooperation, presented at the 2004 meeting of the ‘Waldbroel Group on the European and Euro-Atlantic Coordination of Security Policies vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP).

  29. Intervention of a US member of the ‘Waldbroel Group on the European and Euro-Atlantic Coordination of Security Policies vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP), December 2004.

  30. The IISS Asia Security Conference, First Plenary Session, The Hon Donald Rumsfeld, 04.06.05, http://www.iiss.org, download 05.06.05.

  31. Yet, “China’s ability to project conventional military power beyond its periphery remain limited”. Annual Report to Congress. The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005. Office of the Secretary of Defence. http://www.defenselink.mil/, download: 20.07.05, Executive Summary.

  32. Annual Report to Congress. The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005. Office of the Secretary of Defence, op. cit., p. 3.

  33. ‘2005 U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission Annual Report to Congress’, pp. 117-128. http://www.usc.gov/annual_report/2005/05annual_report_contents.php

  34. David Shambaugh, ‘Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations’, in: Thomas W. Robinson/David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy. Theory and Practice, Oxford 1995, p. 222.

  35. This policy has been recently reemphasized by the US Department of State: “The United States does not support Taiwan independence and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either Taiwan or Beijing”. Press Statement on Taiwan-U.S. Policy, Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, Washington DC, 30.01.06. http://honkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/state/2006/013001.htm, downloaded: 03.02.06.

  36. Interview of the author, 04.06.05 in Taibei.

  37. Michael Kolkmann, ‘Die China-Politik der USA. Konzepte-Erfahrungen-Perspektiven’, SWP-Studie, April 2005, p. 9.

  38. See also: Bates Gill / Gudrun Wacker (Eds.), China’s Rise: Diverging U.S.-EU Perceptions and Approaches, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP, Berlin August 2005.

  39. Interview of the author, 08.03.05 in Washington D.C.

  40. Interview of the author, 11.03.05 in Washington D.C.

  41. Background interview of the author, 09.06.05.

  42. See for that argument: Sebastian Bersick, ‘EU arms embargo: A role for the USA?’, http://www.eias.org/publications/bulletin/2005/janfeb05/marapr05.html.

  43. Interview in Washington D.C., 10.03.05.

  44. Observation of the author during the press conference, 23.05.05.

  45. See also: David Shambaugh, The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China’s Rise, in: The Washington Quarterly, 28:3, Summer 2005, pp. 7–25.

  46. David Shambaugh, op. cit., p. 222.

  47. See for the following: Jisi Wang ‘China’s Changing Role in Asia’, in: Kokobun Ryosei / Jisi Wang (eds.), The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order, Tokyo 2004, 16 pp.

  48. See: Jane Perles, The New York Times, ‘Chinese Move to Eclipse U.S. Appeal in South Asia’, 18.11.2004, p. 5.

  49. Henry Kissinger, ‘Conflict is not an option’, IHT, 09.06.05, p. 9.

  50. Robert B. Zoellick “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?, Remarks to National Committee on U.S-China Relations, 21.09.05, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm. download 22.09.05. In May he has been quoted saying: (…) the United States is intent to deepening economic and political ties with Southeast Asia but not by trying to contain China’s rising influence in the region”. Zoellick: Policy to contain China’s influence ‘foolish’, Agencies, updated 11.05.05, www.chinadaily.com.cn/english, download: 11.05.05.

  51. Interview of the author, 11.03.2005 in Washington D.C.

  52. Interview of the author, 08.03.2005 in Washington D.C.

  53. Michael Vatikiotis, ‘U.S. sights are back on China’, IHT, 07.06.05, p. 6.

  54. See: Francis Fukuyama, ‘Re-Envisioning Asia’, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 75–87; Wang Jisi, ‘China’s Search for Stability with America’, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 39–48.

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Bersick, S. Strategic considerations in the US–China relationship and the role of European soft power. AEJ 4, 251–264 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-006-0053-7

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