Abstract
We investigate how alternative national and international policies and circumstances impact the Clean Development Mechanism’s (CDM) contribution to sustainable development and the pursuit of poverty eradication goals in developing countries. In particular, we focus on the importance of technology-specific versus technology-neutral environmental regulations in the project host regions. We also consider alternative CDM benefit-sharing arrangements between the host and client regions. An analytical impure-public-good model is developed which considers CDM projects as a conditional transfer exerting price and income effects. These, in turn, induce changes in the use of environmental technologies, and with it global and local environmental protection levels. Aided by model simulations using empirical data for China and the European Union, we seek to assess conditions in which CDM transfers are more favourable towards improved environmental protection and welfare in developing regions.
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Notes
A review of the literature concerning the CDM’s contribution to sustainable development is provided by Holm Olsen (2007).
China’s market share of CDM supply was 84% in 2008 (World Bank 2009: 33–34).
Althammer and Buchholz (1993) illustrate such a paradoxical outcome in a graphical presentation.
A similar approach has been employed, e.g., by Löschel and Rübbelke (2009) in their analysis of technological interdependencies between different environmental protection activities in Germany.
European Union plus Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.
See its use, for example, by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
This is taken from www.carbonpositive.net, although prices have fluctuated drastically over 2008–2009.
Assuming all Eastern European hot air is allowed.
The same level is also assumed for the Kyoto Protocol period by Neuhoff et al. (2006).
At the time of writing, this paper was in preparation, and the value of α d changed slightly in the final revision of the paper. This change was not reflected in our calculations.
Of course, such high subsidy rates are hypothetical; it is up to the industrialized region’s optimization process to decide on what are acceptable and reasonable levels of s.
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Acknowledgements
We thank Asbjørn Aaheim, Anil Markandya, Torben K. Mideksa and the participants of the joint workshop “Norwegian-Spanish Dialogue on Climate Change” of BC3 and CICERO in Bilbao in September 2009 for helpful comments.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Supplementary information: derivations
1.1.1 Case 1: Fixed z
From the first-order conditions, we know that:
1.1 Show that dq d /ds > 0.
Rearranging Eq. (3) and obtaining the total derivative:
Substituting from Eq. (36) yields:
By using the chain rule we get:
Substituting Eq. (38) into (39) yields:
Given that q and a are normal goods, dq d /ds > 0 for all s.
1.2 Show that da d /ds < 0.
Obtaining the total derivative of (3), and substituting in from Eq. (36):
By applying the chain rule we obtain:
Substituting Eq. (40) into (41) yields:
Given that q and a are normal goods, we then see that da d /ds < 0 for s < 1.
1.3 Show that dy d /ds > 0.
According to Eq. (4) in the main text it holds that:
Taking the total derivative yields:
Application of the chain rule and substituting from Eqs. (3) and (36) yields:
Hence, we get:
Thus dK d /ds < 0 for all s. Given the budget constraint, we know that dy d /ds > 0 for all s.
1.1.2 Case 2: Fixed a
Starting with Eq. (17) of the main text and rearranging yields:
Taking the total derivative yields:
By substituting from Eq. (39) we get:
As such, we see that dq d /ds > 0 if dMRS z,y /dq d < 0 which is the case under our assumptions for the utility function with fixed a d.
1.1.3 Case 3: Standard optimization
1.1 Show that dq/ds > 0.
Here we can adopt Eq. (18) and its derivation from the previous case, and adjusting it for variable a and q in the utility function yields:
dq d /ds > 0 if dMRS z,y /dz < 0, which is the case under our assumptions for the utility function.
1.2 Derivation of da/ds.
By taking the total derivative of (3) we obtain:
Substitution in Eq. (41) and rearranging yields:
Thus, da d /ds < 0, if pq d > (1 − s)·dpq d /dq d ·dq d /ds.
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Rive, N., Rübbelke, D.T.G. International environmental policy and poverty alleviation. Rev World Econ 146, 515–543 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-010-0063-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-010-0063-9
Keywords
- Abatement technology
- Ancillary benefits
- CDM
- Climate policy
- Impure public goods
- Sustainable development
- Transfers