Abstract.
In this paper we explore the notion that players are “decent” in the sense that their choices are bounded by certain unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to problems of Bankruptcy and Implementation.
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JEL Classification:
D78, D63
The authors wish to express their gratitude for comments and suggestions to N. Baigent, S. Baliga, V. Bashkar, C. Beviá, S. Chattopadhayay, G. Charness, M. Maschler, C. Matutes, P. McAfee, I. Ortuño-Ortín, A. Rangel, J. Roemer, J. Schummer, T. Sjöström, W. Thomson, the participants in seminars in Hakone (Japan), Harvard, Queen’s University, Rochester, Studienzentrum at Gergenzee (Switzerland), two anonymous referees and an associate editor. The usual caveat applies. This research has been partially supported by grants BEC2002-02194, BEC2001-0535, and GV 01-371. This paper is dedicated to Bob Aumann, from whom we have learned so much.
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Corchón, L.C., Herrero, C. A decent proposal. Spanish Economic Review 6, 107–125 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-003-0076-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-003-0076-9