Abstract.
This paper provides two theorems which characterize the domains of valuation functions for which there exist Pareto efficient and truth dominant strategy mechanisms (balanced Groves mechanisms). Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of balanced Groves mechanisms for a general class of valuation functions. Theorem 2 provides new balance-permitting domains of valuation functions by reducing the problem of solving partial differential equations to the problem of solving a polynomial function. It shows that a balanced Groves mechanism exists if and only if each valuation function in the family under consideration can be obtained by solving a polynomial function with order less than \(n-1\), where n is the number of individuals.
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Received: 5 January 1997 / Accepted: 25 May 1999
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Liu, L., Tian, G. A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms. Rev Econ Design 4, 205–218 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050034
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050034