Abstract.
This paper examines how the first-best models of compensation based on the agents' talents and responsibilities analyzed in some recent contributions can be extended to a second-best context. A few social criteria are proposed and compared to alternative approaches by Roemer and Van de gaer.
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Received: 5 March 1997 / Accepted: 19 August 1998
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Bossert, W., Fleurbaey, M. & Van de gaer, D. Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis. Rev Econ Design 4, 35–55 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050025
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050025