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What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis

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Abstract

Experiments based on the Beard and Beil (Manag Sci 40(2):252–262, 1994) two-player coordination game robustly show that coordination failures arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects are not willing to rely on others’ self-interested maximization, and (ii) self-interested maximization is not ubiquitous. Such behavior is often considered to challenge the relevance of subgame perfectness as an equilibrium selection criterion, since weakly dominated strategies are actually used. We report on new experiments investigating whether inequality in payoffs between players, maintained in most lab implementations of this game, drives such behavior. Our data clearly show that the failure to maximize personal payoffs, as well as the fear that others might act this way, do not stem from inequality aversion. This result is robust to varying the saliency of decisions, repetition-based learning and cultural differences between France and Poland.

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Notes

  1. The experimental literature on this game has been initiated by the seminal study by Beard and Beil (1994) and is reviewed in details below. An advantage of the simultaneous-move implementation used in this paper is that both players make decisions independently, so that their behavior is always observable to the experimenter.

  2. The extent to which this preference explains the divergence between human decisions and standard game-theoretical predictions is the subject of a lively debate in experimental economics. For instance, lab experiments by Charness and Grosskopf (2001), Kritikos and Bolle (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004) provide evidence against the inequality aversion hypothesis, while subsequent experiments by Chmura et al. (2005), Fehr et al. (2006), Bolton and Ockenfels (2006), Blanco et al. (2011), as well as a neuroeconomic study by Tricomi et al. (2010), report evidence in its favor.

  3. Krawczyk (2011, p. 112) defines procedural justice as “transparent and impartial rules ensuring that each of the agents involved in an interaction enjoys an equal opportunity to obtain a satisfactory outcome.” In this approach to other-regarding preferences, the individual utility depends not only on the type of achieved outcomes, but also on the way in which they were generated. As discussed in the concluding section, there exists previous experimental evidence that people exhibit a taste for procedural justice and are even willing to sacrifice their own wealth for punishing those who enjoy an undeserved procedural advantage.

  4. Subgame perfectness refines the Nash equilibrium through the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies—which are non-credible threats in the sequential game. The failure to maximize payoff in the game we study precisely amounts to using weakly-dominated strategies. See Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2013) for a more detailed analysis of the theoretical properties of the game.

  5. This hypothesis has been already raised in the literature—see for instance (Goeree and Holt 2001, p. 1416)—but to the best of our knowledge it has never been examined empirically. One exception is treatment 6 in Beard and Beil (1994), discussed in Sect. 3.1. Surprisingly, this treatment is not commented on in the original paper, neither it is discussed as a means to assess the sensitivity of behavior to more equalized payoffs. In any case, as stressed above, the original design of Beard and Beil (1994) is inappropriate for studying player Bs’ behavior, since their decisions are elicited only conditional on player A’s choice.

  6. The treatment effects we seek to identify are best illustrated in the framework of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequality-aversion. Both subjects \(i,j \in \{A,B\}\) are assumed to choose their actions in the game presented in Table 2 according to the extended utility function defined on outcome \(O\) generating payoffs \((O_i;O_j)\):

    $$\begin{aligned} U_i(O| \alpha _i, \beta _i) = O_i-\alpha _i*(O_j-O_i)*\mathbf 1 _{O_i<O_j}-\beta _i*(O_i-O_j)*\mathbf 1 _{O_i>O_j} \end{aligned}$$
    (1)

    Parameters \(0 \le \beta _i \le \alpha _i \) measure the sensitivity of player \(i\) to inequality (\(\mathbf 1 _{O_i<O_j} = 1- \mathbf 1 _{O_i>O_j} = 1\) if \(j\) earns more than \(i\), 0 otherwise). The payoff structures of our Baseline Treatments (BT1 and BT2 in Table 3) are such that \(\exists (\alpha _B, \beta _B): U_B((R,l)^{BT}|\alpha _B, \beta _B) > U_B((R,r)^{BT}|\alpha _B, \beta _B)\), so that a player B whose utility is defined by (1) may prefer outcome \((R,l)\) over \((R,r)\). By the same token, Egalitarian Treatments (ET1-4 in Table 3) are built in such a way that \(\forall (\alpha _B, \beta _B): U_B((R,l)^{ET}|\alpha _B, \beta _B) < U_B((R,r)^{ET}|\alpha _B, \beta _B)\), so that for the same preference parameters, player B now prefers \((R,r)\) over \((R,l)\). As for player As, define \(\theta _T\) as the perceived likelihood that player Bs’ realization of \((\alpha _B, \beta _B)\) makes him prefer \((R,l)\) over \((R,r)\) in Treatment \(T\). If player A is an expected utility maximizer, then \(EU_A(R^T|\alpha _A, \beta _A, \theta _T)=\theta _T U_A((R,l)^T|\alpha _A, \beta _A) + (1-\theta _T) U_A((R,r)^T|\alpha _A, \beta _A)\). As a result, if the fear that player Bs are inequality-averse is high enough, player A may prefer the secure choice in the Baseline Treatment, since \(\exists (\alpha _A, \beta _A, \theta _{BT}): U_A(L^{BT}|\alpha _A, \beta _A) \ge EU_A(R^{BT}|\alpha _A, \beta _A, \theta _{BT})\). By contrast, the Egalitarian Treatment is designed in such a way that \(\theta _{ET}= 0\).

    Table 3 Overview of experimental treatments
  7. In the course of trials leading to the current experimental treatments, we also slightly raised all payoffs from 5.0 in ET1 to 5.5 in ET3, to verify whether decimals have any effect on players’ behavior.

  8. By the same token as above, we slightly raise the payoff earned by player A in the event of unsuccessful attempts to rely on B, from 5.5 to 6.5.

  9. In designing this treatment, we seek to introduce payoff inequality between players, while holding constant the saliency of being reliable for player B . We thus choose to reduce player B’s payoff in \((R,l)\) to 7.00, instead of 8.50 in ET2, and accordingly adjust the payoff stemming from decision \(L\).

  10. As an Eastern European country, Poland seems to sufficiently differ in political and social history from France to serve the purpose of a robustness check of our results to a different cultural background. In particular, experimental evidence suggests that social preferences (like trust and reciprocity) may vary across European countries (Willinger et al. 2003). This robustness treatment complements the contribution of Beard et al. (2001), who use the data from USA and Japan to show that inefficient behavior in Rosenthal’s game persists across cultures. It should be stressed, however, that this treatment does not aim to provide a thorough cross-cultural comparison, but rather to rule out the possibility that our main treatement effects of interest are specific to the location of our experiments.

  11. Although Rosenthal made his conjecture for a one-shot game, Beard and Beil note in their paper (pp. 261–262) that it seems equally valid for repeated play. The authors furthermore state that learning through experience may affect people’s behavior independently of payoff-related factors.

  12. The data from the sixth session run in Warsaw, implementing ET4, have been lost as a result of a software crash.

  13. For French subjects, all the payoffs in experimental instructions were expressed in euros. For Polish subjects, we use the same payoff scheme, but expressed in Experimental Current Units (ECU). For the purposes of payment, ECU were converted to Polish Zloty (PLN) at the rate 1 ECU \(=\) 2 PLN. The participation fee was 5 euros in Paris and 10 PLN (around 2.5 euros according to the current exchange rate in 2012) in Warsaw. Since a vast majority of our subjects are students, and petty student jobs usually pay about 8 euros per hour in Paris and 15 PLN per hour in Warsaw, we strongly believe that the participants’ monetary incentives are comparable between countries.

  14. Disciplines such as economics, engineering, management, political science, psychology, applied mathematics for the social sciences, mathematics, computer science, and sociology.

  15. The procedure is described in more detail in Appendix 1.

  16. In line with individual behavior, outcomes do not react much to treatment. Overall, only 53 % of outcomes in BT1, and 47.7 % in ET1 (\(p=0.249\)), are coordinated. Cooperative outcomes account for 41.3 and 33 % (\(p=0.497\)), respectively. Miscoordination \((L,r)\) is extremely widespread, attaining 39.3 and 39.7 % (\(p=0.955\)) of global outcomes. The most costly miscoordination \((R,l)\) is also pronounced, reaching 7.7 and 12.7 % (\(p=0.220\)) in BT1 and ET1, respectively.

  17. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test using all session averages does not detect differences between the two countries either in the population of player As (\(p=0.980\)) or in the population of player Bs (\(p=0.317\)). We can only test the nullity of the difference for each treatment separately in the first round, when individual decisions are not correlated. The p values are \(p=0.569\) in ET2, and \(p=1\) in ET3 and ET4 for player As, and \(p=0.697\), \(p=0.695\), \(p=0.372\) for player Bs. The results from parametric regressions (see Sect. 5) confirm this conclusion.

  18. The \(p\) values from mean differences between treatments ET1 and ET3/ET4 are \(p=0.175/p=0.399\) in round 1, \(p=0.491/p=0.461\) in rounds 2–10, and \(p=0.446/p=0.418\) in rounds 1–10. The null hypothesis that behavior is the same in all three treatments cannot be rejected in round 1 (\(p=0.290\)), in rounds 2–10 (\(p=0.753\)), or in rounds 1–10 (\(p=0.710\)).

  19. \(p=0.469\) in round 1, \(p=0.249\) in rounds 2–10, \(p=0.193\) in rounds 1–10.

  20. In round 1: \(p=0.469\) against ET1, \(p=0.809\) against ET3; in rounds 2–10: \(p=0.013\) against ET1, \(p=0.004\) against ET3; for rounds 1–10: \(p=0.008\) against ET1, \(p=0.007\) against ET4. Although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that subjects’ behavior in round 1 is the same in all three treatments (\(p=0.462\)), we can do so for rounds 2–10 (\(p=0.006\)) and rounds 1–10 (\(p=0.007\)).

  21. Comparing ET2 against ET3: \(p=0.782\) in round 1, \(p=0.081\) in rounds 2–10, and \(p=0.104\) in rounds 1–10. Comparing ET2 against ET4: \(p=0.555\) in round 1, \(p=0.006\) in rounds 2–10, and \(p=0.001\) in rounds 1–10. Although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that subjects’ behavior in round 1 is the same in all three treatments (\(p=0.701\)), we can do so for rounds 2–10 (\(p=0.012\)) and rounds 1–10 (\(p=0.003\)).

  22. For player As, we find \(p=0.819\) in round 1 and \(p=0.745\) in rounds 2–10;, \(p=0.741\) in rounds 1–10. For player Bs, \(p=0.306\) in round 1 and \(p=0.858\) in rounds 2–10; \(p=0.902\) in rounds 1–10.

  23. In accordance with our results on the effect of saliency, Zizzo and Oswald (2001) also show that the price elasticity of the demand for such punishment is very low.

  24. Heteroscedasticity is due to the linear probability specification. Even if the data generating process was i.i.d (i.e. \(V(u_{is}) = \sigma ^2\), and \(E(u_{is}u_{jt}) = 0~\forall i\ne j\) and \(\forall t \)) the model implies that: \(V(y|X) = Pr(y = 1 | X) [1 - Pr(y = 1 | X) ] = X\beta (1 - X\beta )\).

  25. Reported \(p\) values are associated to statistics computed according to this HC3 procedure. We also ran robustness checks by implementing the HC1 correction, which generally leads to lower estimated standard errors. Our choice is thus conservative as regards our ability to find significant differences in behavior. Based on a correction closely related to the HC3 procedure, Angrist and Lavy (2009) find an inflation of the cluster-robust standard errors by 10 % up to 50 %.

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Correspondence to Nicolas Jacquemet.

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This paper is a revised and extended version of CES Working Paper no. 2011–2036. We wish to thank an anonymous referee and an associate editor for their usefull comments. We are grateful to Juergen Bracht, Boǧaçhan Çelen, Pierre-André Chiappori, Tore Ellingsen, Nick Feltovich, Guillaume Fréchette, Jacob Goeree, Frédéric Koessler, Stéphane Luchini, Rosemarie Nagel, Andreas Ortmann, Jean-Marc Tallon, Antoine Terracol, Marie-Claire Villeval and the participants to the Decision, Risk and Organization seminar at the Columbia Business School for their valuable comments; Maxim Frolov and Michal Krawczyk for their help in running the experiments; and Ivan Ouss and Anna Zylbersztejn for reasearch assistance. We acknowledge financial support from the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and the Paris School of Economics. Nicolas Jacquemet gratefully acknowledges the support of the Institut Universitaire de France. Adam Zylbersztejn is grateful to the Collège des Ecoles Doctorales de l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, the Alliance Program and the Columbia University Economics Department for their financial and scientific support.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Parametric test for equality of proportions

The experimental design raises the issue of two kinds of correlation in the data. First, since players make a sequence of decisions, each subject’s choices might be serially correlated. Second, interaction partners change after each round of the experiment, which might result in an inter-subject correlation. To account for this structure of the data, we perform statistical tests for the comparisons of means through parametric regressions that assume clustered standard errors at the session level. This specification is asymptotically robust to any misspecification of the OLS residuals Williams (2000); Wooldridge (2003). We moreover apply a delete-one jackknife correction to take into account a potential small sample bias.

1.1.1 Standard errors estimation

The data are split into clusters (at the session level) and we denote \(i\) each observation in each cluster \(s\), with \(i=\{1, \ldots , N_s\}\) and \(s=\{1, \ldots , S\}\) so that the total number of observations is \(N=\sum _{s=1}^{S}N_s\). We perform statistical tests for differences between means through linear probability models of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{is}=\sum ^{K}_{k=0} \beta _k x_{is,k}+\epsilon _{is} \end{aligned}$$

in which \(y_{is}\) is a dummy dependent variable, \(X_{is} = \{1, x_{is1}, \ldots , x_{isK}\}\) is the set of explanatory variables including the intercept, \(\{\beta _0, \)...\( , \beta _K\}\) is the set of unknown parameters, and \(\epsilon _{is}\) is the error term. We consider regressions on dummy variables reflecting changes in the environment (for instance, experimental treatments). Because the endogenous variable is itself binary, we also have that: \(E(y|X) = P(y = 1 | X)\). In this specification, the parameters thus reflect the mean change in the probability of the outcome induced by the change in the environment. In the case of one explanatory variable, \(y_{is}= \beta _0 + \beta _1 I_{is} +\epsilon _{is}\), for instance: \( E(y_{is}|I_{is} =1) - E(y_{is}|I_{is} =0) = Pr(y_{is} = 1 | I_{is} =1) - Pr(y_{is} = 1 | I_{is} =0) = \beta _1\), so that the parameter measures the mean variation in the probability of \(y\). The \(t\)-tests on each parameter thus provide significance levels on the differences.

To compute the standard errors, we allow for dependence inside clusters as well as unspecified heteroscedasticity across observations,Footnote 24 i.e. we assume that any two error terms \(i\) and \(j\) are independent between clusters, \(Cov (\epsilon _{ig},\epsilon _{jh})=0~ \forall g \ne h\), but allow for any type of dependence within a cluster, \(Cov(\epsilon _{ig},\epsilon _{jg}) = \sigma ^{2}_{ijg}~\forall i,j,g\). To that end, we correct the estimated covariance matrix at the cluster level using the following procedure, in which the model is written at the cluster level, \(Y_s = X_s \beta + \epsilon _s\), where \(Y_s\) and \(\epsilon _s\) are [\(N_s\) \(\times \) 1] vectors, \(X_s\) is a [\(N_s\) \(\times \) (K+1)] matrix, \(\beta \) is a [(K+1) \(\times \) 1] vector:

  1. 1.

    Using the parameters estimated on pooled data, \(\hat{\beta }_{OLS} = (X' X)^{-1} (X' Y) \), we calculate the vector of error terms in each cluster:

    $$\begin{aligned} \hat{\epsilon }_s=Y_s - X_s \hat{\beta }_{OLS} \end{aligned}$$
  2. 2.

    We then estimate the cluster robust covariance matrix (CRCME):

    $$\begin{aligned} \hat{V}_{CRCME}=\left( X'X \right) ^{-1} \left( \sum _{s=1}^{S} X_{s}' \hat{\epsilon }_s \hat{\epsilon }_{s}' X_s\right) \left( X'X \right) ^{-1} \end{aligned}$$
    (2)

1.1.2 Correction for small sample bias in standard errors

The procedure described above provides a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix which can typically be biased in small samples. What is more, the bias is generally found to be negative, so that significance tests reject the null hypothesis too often. A first way to deal with this issue is to correct for the degrees of freedom by substituting \(\tilde{\epsilon }_{s}=\sqrt{C_{df}}\hat{\epsilon }_{s}\), with \(C_{df}=\frac{S (N-1)}{(S-1) (N-K)}\), in (2)—a procedure known in the literature as HC1. Bell and McCaffrey (2002); Cameron et al. (2008) propose a more accurate correction, called HC3, which estimates the residuals as \(\tilde{\epsilon }_{s}=\sqrt{\frac{S-1}{S}}[I_{N_s}-H_{ss}]^{-1}\hat{\epsilon }_{s}\), where \(I_{N_s}\) is a [\(N_s \times N_s\)] identity matrix, and \(H_{ss}= X_s \left( X'X \right) ^{-1} X_{s}'\). For an OLS regression, this corrected variance-covariance matrix amounts to implement a delete-one jackknife procedure:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{V}_{jackknife}=\frac{S-1}{S} \sum _{s=1}^{S} \left( \tilde{\beta }_{-s}-\hat{\beta } \right) \left( \tilde{\beta }_{-s}-\hat{\beta } \right) ' \end{aligned}$$
(3)

where \(\tilde{\beta }_{-s}\) is the vector of coefficients estimated after leaving out the \(s\)th cluster.Footnote 25

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Jacquemet, N., Zylbersztejn, A. What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis. Rev Econ Design 18, 243–264 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0162-5

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