Abstract
In a social choice model with an infinite number of agents, there may occur “equal size” coalitions that a preference aggregation rule should treat in the same manner. We introduce an axiom of equal treatment with respect to a measure of coalition size and explore its interaction with common axioms of social choice. We show that, provided the measure space is sufficiently rich in coalitions of the same measure, the new axiom is the natural extension of the concept of anonymity, and in particular plays a similar role in the characterization of preference aggregation rules.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Rajat Deb, John Duggan, Ramón García-Cobián, Rabee Tourky, the two anonymous referees and participants at the 2002 Public Choice meetings, the Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and seminars at the University of Melbourne and the University of Sydney for helpful suggestions. Asociación Mexicana de Cultura provided generous support. Part of this research was conducted while Gomberg was visiting the Economic Theory Center at the University of Melbourne, which he thanks for its hospitality and support.
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Gomberg, A., Martinelli, C. & Torres, R. Anonymity in large societies. Soc Choice Welfare 25, 187–205 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s0355-005-0051-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s0355-005-0051-5