Abstract
Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other’s beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants’ behavior was influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bardi, L., Desmet, C., Nijhof, A., Wiersema, J. R., & Brass, M. (2017a). Brain activation for spontaneous and explicit false belief tasks overlaps: new fMRI evidence on belief processing and violation of expectation. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 12, 391–400.
Bardi, L., Six, P., & Brass, M. (2017b). Repetitive TMS of the temporo-parietal junction disrupts participant’s expectations in a spontaneous theory of mind task. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 12, 1775–1782.
Bukowski, H., Hietanen, J. K., & Samson, D. (2015). From gaze cueing to perspective taking: Revisiting the claim that we automatically compute where or what other people are looking at. Visual Cognition, 23(8), 1020–1042.
Castelli, F., Happé, F., Frith, U., & Frith, C. (2000). Movement and mind: a functional imaging study of perception and interpretation of complex intentional movement patterns. NeuroImage, 12(3), 314–325.
Deschrijver, E., Bardi, L., Wiersema, J. R., & Brass, M. (2016). Behavioral measures of implicit theory of mind in adults with high functioning autism. Cognitive Neuroscience, 7, 1–4.
Epley, N., Akalis, S., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). Creating social connection through inferential reproduction—Loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds. Psychological Science, 19, 114–120.
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behavior. American Journal of Psychology, 57, 243–259.
Heyes, C. (2011). Automatic Imitation. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 463–483.
Horowitz, A. C., & Bekoff, M. (2007). Naturalizing anthropomorphism: Behavioral prompts to our humanizing of animals. Anthrozoos, 20, 23–35.
Kilner, J. M., Paulignan, Y., & Blakemore, S. J. (2003). An interference effect of observed biological movement on action. Current Biology, 13, 522–525.
Klapper, A., Ramsey, R., Wigboldus, D., & Cross, E. S. (2014). The control of automatic imitation based on bottom-up and top-down cues to animacy: insights from brain and behavior. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 26(11), 2503–2513.
Kornblum, S., Hasbroucq, T., & Osman, A. (1990). Dimensional overlap—Cognitive basis for stimulus-response compatibility—A model and taxonomy. Psychological Review, 97, 253–270.
Kovács, A. M., Teglas, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010). The social sense: Susceptibility to others’ beliefs in human infants and adults. Science, 330, 1830–1834.
Kovács, Á. M., Kühn, S., Gergely, G., Csibra, G., & Brass, M. (2014). Are all beliefs equal? Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of theory of mind. PLoS One, 9(9), e106558.
Liepelt, R., & Brass, M. (2010b). Top-down modulation of motor priming by belief about animacy. Experimental Psychology, 57(3), 221–227.
Longo, M. R., & Bertenthal, B. I. (2009). Attention modulates the specificity of automatic imitation to human actors. Experimental Brain Research, 192(4), 739–744.
Muller, B. C. N., Brass, M., Kuhn, S., Tsai, C. C., Nieuwboer, W., Dijksterhuis, A., & van Baaren, R. B. (2011). When Pinocchio acts like a human, a wooden hand becomes embodied. Action co-representation for non-biological agents. Neuropsychologia, 49, 1373–1377.
Nijhof, A. D., Brass, M., Bardi, L., & Wiersema, J. R. (2016). Measuring mentalizing ability: A within-subject comparison between an explicit and implicit version of a ball detection task. PLoS One, 11(10), 1–15.
Nijhof, A. D., Brass, M., & Wiersema, J. R. (2017). Spontaneous mentalizing in neurotypicals scoring high versus low on symptomatology of autism spectrum disorder. Psychiatry Research, 258, 15–20.
Phillips, J., Ong, D. C., Surtees, A. D. R., Xin, Y. J., Williams, S., Saxe, R., & Frank, M. C. (2015). A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering Kovács, Teglas, and Endress (2010). Psychological Science, 26, 1353–1367.
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515–526.
Press, C., Gillmeister, H., & Heyes, C. (2006). Bottom-up, not top-down, modulation of imitation by human and robotic models. European Journal of Neuroscience, 24(8), 2415–2419.
Schneider, D., Bayliss, A. P., Becker, S. I., & Dux, P. E. (2011). Eye movements reveal sustained implicit processing of others’ mental states. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 433–438.
Schneider, D., Slaughter, V. P., & Dux, P. E. (2017). Current evidence for automatic Theory of Mind processing in adults. Cognition, 162, 27–31.
Senju, A., Southgate, V., White, S., & Frith, U. (2009). Mindblind eyes: An absence of spontaneous theory of mind in Asperger syndrome. Science, 325, 883–885.
Todd, A. R., Forstmann, M., Burgmer, P., Brooks, A. W., & Galinsky, A. D. (2015). Anxious and egocentric: How specific emotions influence perspective taking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(2), 374–391.
Todd, A. R., & Simpson, A. J. (2016). Anxiety impairs spontaneous perspective calculation: Evidence from a level-1 visual perspective-taking task. Cognition, 156, 88–94.
Tsai, C. C., & Brass, M. (2007). Does the human motor system simulate Pinocchio’s actions? Coacting with a human hand versus a wooden hand in a dyadic interaction. Psychological Science, 18, 1058–1062.
Wiese, E., Wykowska, A., Zwickel, J., & Müller, H. J. (2012). I see what you mean: How attentional selection is shaped by ascribing intentions to others. PloS One, 7, e45391.
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103–128.
Funding
This study was funded by FP7 Marie Sklodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship to Lara Bardi (GRANT 331323-Mirroring and ToM).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
Author LB declares that she has no conflict of interest. Author CD declares that she has no conflict of interest. Author MB declares that he has no conflict of interest.
Ethical approval
All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.
Informed consent
Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.
Electronic supplementary material
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bardi, L., Desmet, C. & Brass, M. Spontaneous Theory of Mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents. Psychological Research 83, 1571–1580 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1000-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1000-0