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Visualizing combinatorial auctions

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Abstract

We propose a novel scheme to visualize combinatorial auctions; auctions that involve the simultaneous sale of multiple items. Buyers bid on complementary sets of items, or bundles, where the utility of securing all the items in the bundle is more than the sum of the utility of the individual items. Our visualizations use concentric rings divided into arcs to visualize the bundles in an auction. The arcs’ positions and overlaps allow viewers to identify and follow bidding strategies. Properties of color, texture, and motion are used to represent different attributes of the auction, including active bundles, prices bid for each bundle, winning bids, and bidders’ interests. Keyframe animations are used to show changes in an auction over time. We demonstrate our visualization technique on a standard testbed dataset generated by researchers to evaluate combinatorial auction bid strategies, and on recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctions designed to allocate wireless spectrum licenses to cell phone service providers.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA

    Joe Ping-Lin Hsiao & Christopher G. Healey

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  1. Joe Ping-Lin Hsiao
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  2. Christopher G. Healey
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Correspondence to Christopher G. Healey.

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Hsiao, J.PL., Healey, C.G. Visualizing combinatorial auctions. Vis Comput 27, 633–643 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00371-011-0576-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00371-011-0576-9

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