Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects – to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation.
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Received: 23 November 1998/Accepted: 20 October 2000
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Ehlers, L. Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 325–348 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100114
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100114