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Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

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Abstract.

Nash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK, , , , , , GB

    Marco Mariotti

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  1. Marco Mariotti
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Received: 12 July 1996 / Accepted: 6 February 1997

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Mariotti, M. Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite. Soc Choice Welfare 15, 413–421 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050114

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050114

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