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Voting paradoxes and referenda

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Abstract.

In representational democracies the referenda constitute an additional way for the voters to express their opinions. At the same time they are accompanied by problems of agenda manipulation and interpretation of results. In this context various voting paradoxes and their interrelationships are of considerable interest. In this article particular attention is paid to opinion aggregation paradoxes in referendum institutions. The limits and interrelationships of paradoxes are discussed. Some ways of avoiding paradoxical situations are also outlined.

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Received: 11 September 1995 / Accepted: 7 January 1997

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Nurmi, H. Voting paradoxes and referenda. Soc Choice Welfare 15, 333–350 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050109

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050109

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