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Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules

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Abstract.

 We establish that the Pareto property is inconsistent with non-dictatorship for social choice rules defined on two-dimensional choice spaces. In addition, we consider applications of this result in higher dimensions.

We also establish the existence of Pareto rules with infinite populations, and show that in this case there is a strong manipulator.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Russian Academy of Sciences, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute Krasikova 32, Moscow 117418, Russia, , , , , , RU

    Gleb Koshevoy

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  1. Gleb Koshevoy
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Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996

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Koshevoy, G. Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules. Soc Choice Welfare 14, 295–302 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050066

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050066

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