Abstract.
Elementary geometry is used to understand, extend and resolve basic informational difficulties in choice theory. This includes axiomatic conclusions such as Arrow’s Theorem, Chichilnisky’s dictator, and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite result. In this manner new results about positional voting methods are outlined, and difficulties with axiomatic approach are discussed. A topological result about “dictatorial” behavior is offered.
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Received: 15 December 1993/Accepted: 22 April 1996
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Saari, D. Informational geometry of social choice. Soc Choice Welfare 14, 211–232 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050061
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050061