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Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives

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Abstract.

A social choice correspondence called the Essential set is studied with the help of an axiom called Cloning Consistency. Cloning consistency is the requirement that the formal choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives. The Essential set is the support of the optimal mixed strategies in a symmetric two-party electoral competition game.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. THEMA, CNRS, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33, boulevard du Port, F-95011, Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France (e-mail: laslier@u-cergy.fr), , , , , , FR

    Jean-François Laslier

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  1. Jean-François Laslier
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Received: 24 March 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999

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Laslier, JF. Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 269–282 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050020

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050020

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