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On relative egalitarianism

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Abstract

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann–Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of 0–1 normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville, Montreal, QC, H3C 3J7, Canada

    Yves Sprumont

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  1. Yves Sprumont
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Correspondence to Yves Sprumont.

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Sprumont, Y. On relative egalitarianism. Soc Choice Welf 40, 1015–1032 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0653-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0653-7

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