Abstract
The standard analysis of procedures (mechanisms), in the theory of implementation, focuses on the properties of the subset of possible outcomes. But since a given procedure may yield very different outcomes in different circumstances (preference profile, information or rationality of players), it may be useful to rely on fine-grained social preferences over outcomes in order to evaluate the procedure. This paper introduces the notion of cross-profile social ordering, and illustrates how this concept may be used for the assessment of procedures.
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This paper has benefited from comments by two anonymous referees, as well as F. Maniquet, H. Moulin, K. Tadenuma, W. Thomson, and reactions of the audience at the conference in honor of Maurice Salles in Caen.
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Fleurbaey, M. Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures. Soc Choice Welf 39, 599–614 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0641-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0641-3