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The majority rule with a chairman

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Abstract

For the case of two alternatives and a given finite set of at least three individuals, seven axioms are shown to characterize the rules that are either the relative majority rule or the relative majority in which a given individual, the chairman, can always break ties. An axiomatization of the relative majority rules with a chairman is suggested that holds for an even number of individuals and that, for an odd number of individuals, characterizes the rules that are either the relative majority rule or a relative majority rule with a chairman.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departament d’Economia, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Avinguda de la Universitat 1, 43204, Reus, Spain

    Antonio Quesada

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  1. Antonio Quesada
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Correspondence to Antonio Quesada.

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Quesada, A. The majority rule with a chairman. Soc Choice Welf 40, 679–691 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0633-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0633-3

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