Skip to main content
Log in

The original Borda count and partial voting

  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In a Borda count, bc, M. de Borda suggested the last preference cast should receive 1 point, the voter’s penultimate ranking should get 2 points, and so on. Today, however, points are often awarded to (first, second,..., last) preferences cast as per (n, n−1, ..., 1) or more frequently, (n −1, n−2,..., 0). If partial voting is allowed, and if a first preference is to be given n or n − 1 points regardless of how many preferences the voter casts, he/she will be incentivised to rank only one option/candidate. If everyone acts in this way, the bc metamorphoses into a plurality vote... which de Borda criticized at length. If all the voters submit full ballots, the outcome—social choice or ranking—will be the same under any of the above three counting procedures. In the event of one or more persons submitting a partial vote, however, outcomes may vary considerably. This preliminary paper suggests research should consider partial voting. The author examines the consequences of the various rules so far advocated and then purports that M. de Borda, in using his formula, was perhaps more astute than the science has hitherto recognised.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Abbreviations

av (= irv = stv):

alternative vote

irv (= av = stv):

instant run-off voting

pr :

proportional representation

stv (= av = irv):

single transferable vote

bc :

Borda count

mbc :

modified bc

qbs :

quota Borda system

trs :

two-round voting

References

  • Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values. Yale University Press, New Haven and London

    Google Scholar 

  • Black D (1958) The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • de Borda JC (1781) Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin, Mémoire de l’Académie Royale. Histoire de l’Académie des Sciences, Paris, pp 657–665

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett M (1997) Principles of electoral reform. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 150–151

    Google Scholar 

  • Emerson PJ (1994) The politics of consensus. Samizdat, Belfast

    Google Scholar 

  • Emerson PJ (2007) Designing an all-inclusive democracy. Springer, Heidelberg and Berlin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • McLean I, Urken AB (1995) Classics of social choice. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

  • Saari DG (2001) Decisions and elections, explaining the unexpected. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Saari DG (2008) Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sigmund PE (1963) Nicholas of cusa and medieval political thought. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter Emerson.

Additional information

In a ballot on n options/candidates, a partial vote is one in which the voter ranks only m options/candidates, where 1m < n.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Emerson, P. The original Borda count and partial voting. Soc Choice Welf 40, 353–358 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9

Keywords

Navigation