Abstract
Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is modeled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted to {0, 1}. The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces a hierarchy in the set of players in terms of the a-priori influence that the players have over the decision making process. In order to determine this hierarchy in a swap robust game, one has to either evaluate a power index (e.g., the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf–Coleman index) for each player or conduct a pairwise comparison between players, whereby a player i is ranked higher than another player j if there exists a coalition in which i is more desirable as a coalition partner than j. In this paper, we outline an alternative mechanism to determine the ranking of players in terms of their a-priori power. This simple and elegant method uses only minimal winning coalitions, rather than the entire set of winning coalitions.
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This work was done when M. Bishnu was at Iowa State University, USA.
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Bishnu, M., Roy, S. Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games. Soc Choice Welf 38, 11–22 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0504-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0504-3