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Critical decisions and constitutional rules

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Abstract

Many constitutions specify procedures that allow critical decisions to be made with a different rule than routine decisions. We propose a theory of constitutional rules that explains why. The theory is based on the assumption that the type of a decision can be observed, but not verified. We characterize two classes of second-best constitutions, both with clear analogues in real world constitutions: (i) incentive scheme (IS) constitutions that elicit information about the type of a decision through a costly switching procedure and (ii) veto (VT) constitutions that grant limited veto powers to interested parties.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Ave., Cambridge, CB3 9DD, UK

    Toke S. Aidt

  2. Department of Economics and CMPO, University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Rd., Bristol, BS8 1TN, UK

    Francesco Giovannoni

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  1. Toke S. Aidt
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  2. Francesco Giovannoni
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Correspondence to Francesco Giovannoni.

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Aidt, T.S., Giovannoni, F. Critical decisions and constitutional rules. Soc Choice Welf 37, 219–268 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0492-3

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