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On the limits of democracy

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Abstract

In this article, we extend the analysis of Gersbach (2009) and explore the limits of democratic constitutions to achieve first-best outcomes. We establish the most general possibility result and we illustrate the efficiency gains of flexible majority rules by examples. We show that no first-best constitution exists if there is uncertainty regarding the size of losses and benefits from public projects.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CER-ETH-Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich and CEPR, Zürichbergstrasse 18, 8092, Zurich, Switzerland

    Hans Gersbach

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  1. Hans Gersbach
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Correspondence to Hans Gersbach.

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Gersbach, H. On the limits of democracy. Soc Choice Welf 37, 201–217 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0490-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0490-5

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