Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A model of deliberation based on Rawls’s political liberalism

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this article, we present a model of deliberation based on Rawls’s political liberalism. Our formalization gives a new perspective on his political theory. Moreover, we obtain quantitative results on political deliberation under Rawlsian rules. Finally, we elaborate two arguments in favor of Rawlsian deliberation: first, deliberation is epistemically valuable when, all other things being equal, it tends to favor the better view, because in this case, deliberators settle on the better view with high probability. Second, results suggest that when citizens deliberate within the limits of Rawlsian public reason, they can reach unanimity faster than when they deliberate outside these limits.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aaken A, List C, Luetge C (2004) Deliberation and decision: economics, constitutional theory and deliberative democracy. Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot

    Google Scholar 

  • Alligood K, Sauer T, Yorke J (1997) Chaos: an introduction to dynamical systems. Springer, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Austen-Smith D, Banks J (1996) Information aggregation, rationality, and the condorcet jury theorem. Am Polit Sci Rev 90(1): 34–45

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Austen-Smith D, Feddersen TJ (2006) Deliberation, preference uncertainty, and voting rules. Am Polit Sci Rev 100(02): 209–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod R (1997) The dissemination of culture: a model with local convergence and global polarization. J Conflict Resolut 41(2): 203–226

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen J (1993) Moral pluralism and political consensus. In: David Copp JH, Roemer J (eds) The idea of democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 270–291

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman J (1998) Civic pedagogies and liberal-democratic curricula. Ethics 108(4): 746–761

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elster J (1979) Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Ethier S, Kurtz T (1993) Fleming–Viot processes in population genetics. SIAM J Control Optim 31: 345

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ewens W (1964) The pseudo-transient distribution and its uses in genetics. J Appl Probab 1(1): 141–156

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ewens W (2004) Mathematical population genetics: theoretical introduction. Springer Verlag, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Galam S, Moscovici S (1991) Towards a theory of collective phenomena: consensus and attitude changes in groups. Eur J Soc Psychol 21(1): 49–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gardenfors P (1992) Belief revision. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goodin RE (2008) First talk, then vote. In: Goodin RE (eds) Innovating democracy: democratic theory and practice after the deliberative turn. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 108–124

    Google Scholar 

  • Gourdon X (1998) Les Maths en tete: Mathematiques pour M’ : algebre (in French). Ellipses, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Grasman J, Ludwig D (1983) The accuracy of the diffusion approximation to the expected time to extinction for some discrete stochastic processes. J Appl Probab 20(2): 305–321

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grimmett G, Stirzaker D (2001) Probability and random processes, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Gutmann A (1995) Civic education and social diversity. Ethics 105(3): 557–579

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Habermas J (1990) Moral Consciousness and communicative action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Haidt J (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychol Rev 108(4): 814–834

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hedrick P (2005) Genetics of populations. Jones & Bartlett Publishers, Sudbury

    Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J (2001) Cultural transmission and the diffusion of innovations: adoption dynamics indicate that biased cultural transmission is the predominate force in behavioral change. Am Anthropol 103(4): 992–1013

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holsinger K (2007a) Population biology simulations (drift). http://darwin.eeb.uconn.edu/simulations/drift.html

  • Holsinger K (2007b) Population biology simulations (natural selection). http://darwin.eeb.uconn.edu/simulations/selection.html

  • Holsinger K (2007c) Population biology simulations (selection and genetic drift). http://darwin.eeb.uconn.edu/simulations/selection-drift.html

  • Kimura M (1983) The neutral theory of molecular evolution. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kolm S (2001) Vox populi, vox dei: endogenous social choice and the rational original position. http://www.ehess.fr/kolm/document.php?id=115.

  • Kuran T (1997) Private truths, public lies: the social consequences of preference falsification. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Landa D, Meirowitz A (2009) Game theory, information, and deliberative democracy. Am J Polit Sci 53(2): 427–444

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer K, Wagner C (1981) Rational consensus in science and society: a philosophical and mathematical study. D Reidel Pub Co, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Levene H (1953) Genetic equilibrium when more than one ecological niche is available. Am Nat 87(836): 331

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liggett TM (1985) Interacting particle systems. Springer, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Luskin R, Fishkin J, Jowell R (2002) Considered opinions: deliberative polling in Britain. Br J Polit Sci 32(03): 455–487

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lustick IS, Miodownik D (2000) Deliberative democracy and public discourse: the agent-based argument repertoire model. Complexity 5(4): 13–30

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macedo S (1995) Liberal civic education and religious fundamentalism: the case of God v. John Rawls?. Ethics 105(3): 468–496

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manin B, Stein E, Mansbridge J (1987) On legitimacy and political deliberation. Polit Theory 15(3): 338–368

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meirowitz A (2002) Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types. Soc Choice Welf 19(1): 219–236

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meirowitz A (2007) In defense of exclusionary deliberation: communication and voting with private beliefs and values. J Theor Polit 19(3): 301

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mendelberg T (2002) The deliberative citizen: theory and evidence. In: Michael RYS, Delli Carpini X, Huddy Leonie (eds) Political decision making, deliberation and participation, vol 6. Elsevier Press, New York, pp 151–193

    Google Scholar 

  • Mozert v. Hawkins City Board of Education. 827 F.2d 1058 (1987). http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/mozert.htm

  • Neapolitan RE (2004) Learning Bayesian networks. Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Belknap Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1996) Political liberalism (Paperback ed). Columbia University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1999) The law of peoples, chapter the idea of public reason revisited. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 129–180

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (2001) Justice as fairness: a restatement. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Raz J (1990) Facing diversity: the case of epistemic abstinence. Philos Public Aff 19(1): 3–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogers E (1995) Diffusion of innovation, 4th edn. The Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandel M (1998) Liberalism and the limits of justice, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Shiga T (1980) An interacting system in population genetics. J Math Kyoto Univ 20(2): 213–242

    Google Scholar 

  • Sznajd-Weron K, Sznajd J (2000) Opinion evolution in closed community. Int J Mod Phys C 11(06): 1157–1165

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weikard H (2004) On the economics of basic liberties. Soc Choice Welf 22(1): 267–280

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weisbuch G, Deffuant G, Amblard F, Nadal J (2002) Meet, discuss, and segregate!. Complexity 7(3): 55–63

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams D (1991) Probability with martingales. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ecole Normale Superieure, 75005, Paris, France

    Mostapha Benhenda

Authors
  1. Mostapha Benhenda
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mostapha Benhenda.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Benhenda, M. A model of deliberation based on Rawls’s political liberalism. Soc Choice Welf 36, 121–178 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0469-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0469-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation