Abstract
Given a bargaining problem, the relative utilitarian (RU) solution maximizes the sum total of the bargainer’s utilities, after having first renormalized each utility function to range from zero to one. We show that RU is “optimal” in two very different senses. First, RU is the maximal element (over the set of all bargaining solutions) under any partial ordering which satisfies certain axioms of fairness and consistency; this result is closely analogous to the result of Segal (J Polit Econ 108(3):569–589, 2000). Second, RU offers each person the maximum expected utility amongst all rescaling-invariant solutions, when it is applied to a random sequence of future bargaining problems generated using a certain class of distributions; this is recalls the results of Harsanyi (J Polit Econ 61:434–435, 1953) and Karni (Econometrica 66(6):1405–1415, 1998).
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Pivato, M. Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. Soc Choice Welf 32, 79–92 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0313-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0313-0