Abstract
This paper uses a formal analysis of the relation of ‘parity’ to make sense of a well-known solution to Parfit’s ‘mere addition paradox’. This solution is sometimes dismissed as a recourse to ‘incomparability’. In this analysis, however, the solution is consistent with comparability, as well as transitivity of ‘better than’. The analysis is related to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson’s ‘incomplete critical-level generalised utilitarianism’ (ICLGU). ICLGU is inspired by Parfit’s work and can be related to the analysis of parity, though the distinctive ‘mark’ of parity suggests that the boundaries of a set of critical levels is not exact. One has to allow for vagueness to make an account based on parity plausible. These accounts are then contrasted with Broome’s view which also involves vagueness.
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I am grateful to Ashley Piggins, Maurice Salles and Bob Sugden for very helpful comments on earlier versions. I am also very grateful to an anonymous referee for some very insightful comments. I have also benefited from comments from, and discussion on related ideas with Gustaf Arrhenius, John Broome, Robin Cubitt, James Griffin, Wlodek Rabinowicz and Bob Sugden. Finally, I would also like to thank John Broome for allowing me to read various forthcoming manuscripts. Any errors are mine.
An erratum to this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0173-4.
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Qizilbash, M. The mere addition paradox, parity and critical-level utilitarianism. Soc Choice Welfare 24, 413–431 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0305-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0305-z