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Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem

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Summary.

Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are “almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are “appropriately heterogeneous”, with preferences similar to those generating the “paradox of voting”.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo (Murcia), SPAIN (e-mail: qnio@um.es) , , , , , , ES

    Antonio Quesada

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  1. Antonio Quesada
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Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001

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Quesada, A. Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem. Econ Theory 20, 623–627 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100219

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100219

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