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Kamenica, E., Kim, K. & Zapechelnyuk, A. Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Econ Theory 72, 701–704 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01383-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01383-4