Abstract
Developed countries have experienced labor employment shifts from the manufacturing sector to the services sector, which is a process termed structural change. We construct a two-sector endogenous growth model of structural change in which knowledge spillover sustains growth. Our model is consistent with the empirically observed pattern of structural change as well as aggregate balanced growth. In both centralized and decentralized economies, labor employment shifts from a high productivity growth sector to a low productivity growth sector. Because of knowledge spillover, excessive labor is allocated to productivity improvements in the high productivity growth sector. Hence, the decentralized economy is characterized by rapid structural change compared to the optimal allocation.
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Notes
For example, see Kuznets (1971), Maddison (1980), Baumol et al. (1985), and Jorgenson and Timmer (2011). Some authors note that services are heterogeneous and that the service sector contains some subsectors that show the economy’s highest productivity growth and some that show the lowest productivity growth (Baumol et al. 1985; Jorgenson and Timmer 2011). However, for simplicity, we do not consider such heterogeneity of services.
Some authors introduce both approaches into unified frameworks. İşcan (2010) finds that although both approaches are important, productivity growth differentials played a relatively important role in structural change in the second half of the twentieth century in the USA. Boppart (2014) examines postwar US structural change and finds that both approaches are equally important. Guilló et al. (2011) examine structural change from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors considering both approaches. The authors conclude that the second approach is important. Echevarria (1997) and Buera and Kaboski (2009) also introduce both approaches into unified frameworks.
See Theorem 5 of Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006). Equation (74) shows the employment shift from Sector 2 to Sector 1. Equations (71), (73), and (75) imply that Sector 1 experiences higher productivity growth than Sector 2.
The first generation of the innovation-based endogenous growth model, such as Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), has been empirically criticized because it exhibits “scale effects”: The growth rate of the economy is proportional to resources employed in the R&D sector (see Jones 1995). Broadly speaking, there are two types of endogenous growth models without scale effects. The first type is the semi-endogenous growth model, where the long-run growth rate is proportional to the population growth rate. The second is characterized by the presence of both horizontal and vertical innovations. Authors such as Lainez and Peretto (2006) provide evidence that supports the second type.
The second-order condition for firms’ profit maximization, \(\partial ^2 \Pi _{i,j}(t-1)/\partial b_{i,j}(t)^2 <0\), where \( \Pi _{i,j}(t-1)\) is defined later, requires the elasticity \(za_i^\prime (z)/a_i(z)\) to increase with \(z= b_{i,j}(t) /\overline{b}_{i}(t-1) \). The specification of Young (1998) satisfies this property. However, a constant elasticity function, \(a(z)=z^d\) (\(d>1)\), fails to satisfy this property.
Ngai and Samaniego (2011) study sources of productivity differential for US industries. They find that the main determinant of difference in productivity growth among production sectors is technology of knowledge production.
Industries such as research and business services have large shares of R&D employment. Under the NACE industry classification scheme REV. 1, these are classified as 73 and 74. Both are included in Market Services in Table 1.
Even if \( \varepsilon >1 \), (10) and (25) hold. A comparison between (12) and (13) shows that if \( \varepsilon >1 \) (and \( \varepsilon \ne 1+1/\sigma \)), \( A_2(t)/A_1(t) \) and \( N(t) ({=}N_2(t)/N_1(t)) \) move in the same direction. Thus, employment shifts from the low productivity growth sector to the high productivity growth sector. When \( 1<\varepsilon <1+1/\sigma \), the productivity growth in Sector 2 is lower than that in Sector 1, while the productivity growth in Sector 2 is higher than that in Sector 1 when \( \varepsilon >1+1/\sigma \).
We can show that if the instantaneous utility takes a CRRA form, \( D(t)^{1-\zeta }/(1-\zeta ) \) (\( \zeta >0 \) and \( \zeta \ne 1\)), structural change does not satisfy aggregate balanced growth in our model.
See footnote 4 in Introduction of this paper.
Monopolistic competition also creates inefficient allocation. A small \( \alpha \) indicates a strong market power. In both centralized and decentralized economies, the rates of structural change are independent of \( \alpha \). Then, monopolistic competition does not generate disparity in the rates of structural change between the centralized and decentralized economies.
See footnote 12 in Young (1998) for more details.
Proposition 2 does not prove the uniqueness of the solution for the central planner’s problem. However, we reasonably guess that the solution is unique because of the concavity of utility function and the convexity of \( a_i(\cdot ) \).
This result holds even under a Dixit–Stiglitz-type consumption index because our specification of composite good, (2), includes the Dixit–Stiglitz type.
Besides \( \tau ^I_i(t) \) and \( \tau ^E_i(t) \), production subsides are also needed to realize the optimal allocation because of monopolistic competition. Let us denote the subsidy rate as \( \tau ^P_i(t) \). The operating profit of firm j in Sector i is given by \( \pi _{i,j}(t) = [p_{i,j}(t) -(1-\tau ^P_i(t) )w(t)/b_{i,j}(t) ] x_{i,j}(t) \). We can show that the optimal subsidy rate satisfies \( 1-\tau ^P_i(t)=\sigma \alpha /(1-\alpha ) \). Because the presence of \( \tau ^P_i(t) \) does not affect the characteristics of the optimal \( \tau ^I_i(t) \) and \( \tau ^E_i(t) \), we do not consider \( \tau ^P_i(t) \) for simplicity.
Even under (22), (38) and (41) hold. The other two first-order conditions are modified as
$$\begin{aligned}&\lambda _P(t) \frac{n_i^*(t)x_i^*(t)}{b_i^*(t)} =v(t)^\frac{1-\varepsilon }{\varepsilon } \gamma _i \left( n_i^*(t)^{\sigma +1} x_i^*(t) -s_i\right) ^\frac{-1}{\varepsilon } n_i^*(t)^{\sigma +1} x_i^*(t) , \\&v(t)^\frac{1-\varepsilon }{\varepsilon } (\sigma +1) \gamma _i \left( n_i^*(t)^{\sigma +1} x_i^*(t) -s_i \right) ^\frac{-1}{\varepsilon }n_i^*(t)^{\sigma +1} x_i^*(t)\\&\quad = n_i^*(t) \left[ \lambda _P(t) \frac{x_i^*(t)}{b_i^*(t)} + \frac{\lambda _I(t-1)}{\beta } a_i\left( \frac{b_i^*(t)}{b_i^*(t-1)} \right) \right] . \end{aligned}$$From these equations and \( \lambda (t) \equiv \lambda _P(t) = \lambda _I(t) \), we obtain \( \sigma \lambda (t) \frac{n_i^*(t)x_i^*(t)}{b_i^*(t)} = \frac{\lambda (t-1)}{\beta } a_i(t)n_i^*(t) \). From the last equation, (41), and \( a_i(g)= f_i e^{\xi _i g} \), we derive (23).
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Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor of this journal, Nicholas Yannelis, for their constructive comments. We also thank Shuhei Aoki, Yosuke Furukawa, Koichi Futagami, Hirokazu Ishise, Tatsuro Iwaisako, Munechika Katayama, Yoko Konishi, Kazuo Mino, Akira Momota, Mototsugu Shintani, Shuhei Takahashi, Takayuki Tsuruga, Katsunori Yamada, and seminar participants at Aoyamagakuin University, Kyoto University, and Osaka University. Hori’s research was financially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant No. 15K17025.
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Appendices
Appendices
1.1 Appendix 1: Optimization problem of the representative household
We solve the optimization problem of the representative household in three steps. We first maximize (2) subject to (3), which yields the following demand function for brand j of good i:
Substituting (24) into (2) yields \(D_i(t) = E_i(t)/P_i(t)\), where \(P_i(t) \equiv {n_i(t)}^{\frac{1-\alpha }{\alpha }-\sigma } \left[ \int ^{n_i(t)}_0 { p_{i,j}(t) }^{-\frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha } } \mathrm{d}j \right] ^{-\frac{1-\alpha }{\alpha } }\) is the price index of the composite good i. The next step maximizes (1) subject to \(E(t) = E_1(t) + E_2(t)\) and \(D_i(t) = E_i(t)/P_i(t)\) to obtain
Using \(E(t)=P_1(t)D_1(t)+P_2(t)D_2(t)\) and the first equation of (25), we can rewrite (1) as \(D(t) = E(t)/P(t)\), where \(P(t) \equiv [ \gamma ^\varepsilon {P_1(t)}^{1-\varepsilon } + (1-\gamma )^\varepsilon {P_2(t)}^{1-\varepsilon } ]^\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon }\) represents the price index for all consumption goods. We normalize \( P_t=1 \). We finally maximize U(t) subject to (4) and \(D(t) = E(t)/P(t)\), which yields
The transversality condition is \( \lim _{t \rightarrow +\infty } \beta ^t W(t)/E(t)=0 \).
1.2 Appendix 2: Solution for decentralized economy
We begin with the derivation of (12). Using (7a) and the definition of \( P_i(t) \) [see the sentence just below (24)], we obtain
We substitute the first equation of (10) and (27) into the second equation of (25) to obtain
In the second equality, we use \( b_i(t)=b_{i,0}{g_i}^t \). Solving this equation for N(t) yields (12).
The remainder of this appendix provides the solutions of variables other than N(t) and checks the transversality condition. We first derive \( L^I(t) \) and \( L^P(t) \). We use (26) and (8) to obtain
Using (9) and \( E(t) = E_1(t) + E_2(t) \), we obtain
From (28) and (29), we have \( L^I(t)/L^P(t)= (1-\alpha )\beta /\alpha \). Using this equation and \( L=L^I(t)+L^P(t) \), we can derive
We next derive E(t) , \( E_1(t) \), and \( E_2(t) \). (29) and (30) imply
From the first equation of (10), (12), and \( E(t) = E_1(t) + E_2(t) \), we have
Because \( L^I(t) \) is constant, W(t) is also constant.
Here, we use the first equality of (28). From (31) and (33), W(t) / E(t) becomes constant. Then, the transversality condition, \( \lim _{t \rightarrow +\infty } \beta ^t W(t)/E(t)=0 \), is satisfied.
From (12) and the first equality of (28), we derive
These two equations give the sequences of \( n_1(t) \) and \( n_2(t) \). If \( G=1 \), \( n_1(t) \) and \( n_2(t) \) are constant over time. If \( G>1 \), \( n_1(t) \) decreases over time and satisfies \( \lim _{t \rightarrow \infty } n_1(t)=0 \). In contrast, \( n_2(t) \) increases over time and satisfies \( \lim _{t \rightarrow \infty } n_2(t)=L^I/a_2(g_2) \). Because of \( L^I_i(t)=a_i(g_i)n_i(t+1) \) [see (8)], (34) drives the dynamics of \( L^I_i(t) \). Substituting (34) and \( b_{i,t}= b_{i,0} {g_i}^t \) into \( A_i(t) = b_i(t) n_i(t)^\sigma \), we obtain the dynamics of \( A_i(t) \).
The sequence of \( p_i(t) \) is given by \( p_i(t) =w(t) [\alpha b_i(t)]^{-1} = w(t) [\alpha b_{i,0} {g_i}^t]^{-1}\) [see (7a)]. The sequence of \( P_i(t) \) is given by \( P_i(t) =w(t) [\alpha b_i(t) {n_i(t)}^\sigma ]^{-1}= w(t)[\alpha b_{i,0} {g_i}^t {n_i(t)}^\sigma ]^{-1}\). Substituting \( P_i(t) \) into \(P(t) = [ \gamma ^\varepsilon {P_1(t)}^{1-\varepsilon } + (1-\gamma )^\varepsilon {P_2(t)}^{1-\varepsilon } ]^\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon } =1 \) yields
Given the sequences of \( b_i(t) \) and \( n_i(t) \), the above equation gives the sequence of w(t) . (31) and (33) give the sequences of E(t) and W(t) , respectively. The sequences of \( E_1(t) \) and \( E_2(t) \) are given by (32). The sequences of \( p_i(t) \) and \( P_i(t) \) are given by \( p_i(t) = w(t) [\alpha b_{i,0} {g_i}^t]^{-1}\) and \( P_i(t) = w(t)[\alpha b_{i,0} {g_i}^t {n_i(t)}^\sigma ]^{-1}\), respectively. Now, we have the sequences of \(n_i(t)\), \( E_i(t) \), and \( p_i(t) \). Then, the sequences of \( x_i(t) \) and \( \pi _i(t) \) are given by (7b) and (7c), respectively.
From (26) and (31), we have \( D(t+1)/D(t)=E(t+1)/E(t) = w(t+1)/w(t) \). Using \( P(t) = [ \gamma ^\varepsilon {P_1(t)}^{1-\varepsilon } + (1-\gamma )^\varepsilon {P_2(t)}^{1-\varepsilon } ]^\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon } =1 \), we obtain the following relation:
The second equality uses the second equation of (25). The third equality uses the first equation of (10), (12), and \( P_1(t) = w(t) [\alpha b_{1,0} {g_1}^t {n_1(t)}^\sigma ]^{-1}\). The last equality uses the first equation of (34). From (36) and \( D(t+1)/D(t)=w(t+1)/w(t) \), we obtain
where \( \phi = \frac{ 1-\varepsilon }{1+\sigma (1-\varepsilon ) } \) is defined just below (12). If \(G=1\), \( D(t+1)/D(t) \) is constant. In contrast, if \({G}>1\), \( D(t+1)/D(t) \) decreases with t and satisfies \( \lim _{t \rightarrow +\infty } D(t+1)/D(t) = g_2 \). As in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), the asymptotic constant growth path exists.
1.3 Appendix 3: Centralized economy
The first-order conditions for the central planner’s problems are
where \( i= \)1 or 2, \( \gamma _1=\gamma \), \( \gamma _2=1-\gamma \), and \( \lambda _P(t) \) and \( \lambda _I(t) \) are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with (15) and (16), respectively. We must have \( L^{P*}(t) \in (0, L) \) because if \( L^{P*}(t) = L \), no intermediate firms produce in period t and if \( L^{P*}(t) = 0 \), there are no intermediate goods firms in period \( t+1 \). Then, (38) holds. We denote \( \lambda (t) \equiv \lambda _P(t) = \lambda _I(t) \).
Using (15), (39), and the definition of v(t) , we obtain \( {L^P}^*(t) = \frac{v(t)^\frac{1-\varepsilon }{\varepsilon }}{\lambda (t)} \sum _{i} \gamma _i \left( n_i^*(t)^{\sigma +1} x_i^*(t) \right) ^\frac{\varepsilon -1}{\varepsilon } = 1/\lambda (t) \).
From (15), (16), (40), the definition of v(t) , and \( {L^P}^*(t)= 1/\lambda (t) \), we can derive \( \sigma \beta = \lambda (t) {L^I}^*(t) \).
We substitute \( {L^P}^*(t)= 1/\lambda (t) \) and \( \sigma \beta = \lambda (t) {L^I}^*(t) \) into \( L={L^P}^*(t) + {L^I}^*(t) \) to obtain
We denote \( g_{i}^*(t) \equiv b_i^*(t)/b_i^*(t-1) \) and \( G^*(t) =[g_{1}^*(t)/g_{2}^*(t)]^\phi \). To simplify our expressions, we denote \( a_i \left( g_{i}^*(t) \right) =a_{i}^*(t) \). From (39) and (40), the following two relations are obtained:
In addition, from (39), (40), and (43), we obtain
Using (44) and (45), we obtain
Using (41), (43), and \( a_i(g)= f_i e^{\xi _i g} \), we derive
This equation shows \( g_{i}^*(t) \ge (\sigma \xi _i)^{-1} >0 \). (47) and (48) show \( n_i^*(t)>0 \). If \( g_{i}^*(t)=+\infty \), the resource constraint implies that \( n_i^*(t) \) must be strictly equal to zero. To ensure \( n_i^*(t)>0 \), \( g_{i}^*(t)<+\infty \) must hold.
We now prove a series of lemmas to prove Proposition 2 in Sect. 4.
Lemma 1
Suppose that Assumption (i) is satisfied (\( 0<\varepsilon <1 \)) and that \( \xi _1=\xi _2 \). There exists a solution for the central planner’s problem such that \( g^*_1(t)=g^*_2(t)= [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi ]^{-1} \) and \( G^*(t) =1 \) for all \( t=0,1,\ldots \).
Proof
We guess that \( g_{1}^*(t) =g_{2}^*(t) =g^*(t) \) holds for all \( t=0,1,\ldots \). Then, we verify this guess and derive the expression for \( g^*(t) \).
Because \( g_{1}^*(t) =g_{2}^*(t) =g^*(t) \) holds for all \( t=0,1,\ldots \), we have \( a_{1}^*(t)/a_{2}^*(t) = f_1/f_2 \) and \( b_{1}^*(t)/b_{2}^*(t) = b_{1,0}/b_{2,0} \). Consequently, (47) and (48) show that \( a_{i}^*(t)n_i^*(t) \) becomes constant. We can rewrite (49) as \( g_{i}^*(t) = 1/(\sigma \xi ) + \beta g_{i}^*(t+1) \). This difference equation has a unique and unstable steady state, where \( g_{i}^*(t)= [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi ]^{-1} \). Because \( 0<g_{i}^*(t) < +\infty \), \( g_{i}^*(t) \) always stays at the steady state, which implies \( g_{1}^*(t) =g_{2}^*(t)= [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi ]^{-1} \) and \( G^*(t) =1 \) for all \( t=0,1,\ldots \). \(\square \)
Lemma 2
Suppose that Assumption (i) is satisfied (\( 0<\varepsilon <1 \)) and \( \xi _1=\xi _2 \). There exists a solution for the central planner’s problem such that \( G_{n}^*(t)=G_{L^I}^*(t)=G_{L^P}^*(t) = G^*(t) =1 \) for all \( t=0,1,\ldots \).
Proof
We have \( {L^I}^*_i(t) = a_i^*(t+1)n_i^*(t+1) \) and \( {L^p}^*_i(t) = n_i^*(t)x_i^*(t)/b_i^*(t) \). From (43), we have \( {L^I_2}^*(t-1)/{L^I_1}^*(t-1)={L^P_2}^*(t)/{L^P_1}^*(t) = a_2^*(t)n_2^*(t) / [ a_1^*(t)n_1^*(t) ] \). If \( \xi _1=\xi _2 \), we have \( g_{1}^*(t) =g_{2}^*(t)= [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi ]^{-1} \) and \( G^*(t)=1 \) from Lemma 1. Then, \( a_i^*(t) \) and \( n_2^*(t)/n_1^*(t) \) become constant. Consequently, \( {L^I_2}^*(t-1)/{L^I_1}^*(t-1) \) and \( {L^P_2}^*(t)/{L^P_1}^*(t) \) are constant. \(\square \)
Lemma 3
Suppose that Assumption (i) is satisfied (\( 0<\varepsilon <1 \)) and that \( \xi _1<\xi _2 \). There exists a solution for the central planner’s problem such that \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } g^*_1(t)=g^*_1 \) and \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } g^*_2(t)= [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _2 ]^{-1} \equiv g^*_2 \), where \( g^*_1 \) is defined by (17) and satisfies \( g^*_2< g_{1}^* < [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _1 ]^{-1}\).
Proof
We guess \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } g^*_1(t)=g^*_1> g^*_2=\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } g^*_2(t) \). Then, we verify this guess and derive the expressions for \( g^*_1 \) and \( g^*_2 \).
Because of \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } g^*_1(t)=g^*_1> g^*_2=\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } g^*_2(t) \), we have \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } a_{1}^*(t)/a_{2}^*(t) \) is constant and \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } b_{1}^*(t)/b_{2}^*(t) = +\infty \). Consequently, (48) shows \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } a_{2}^*(t)n_2^*(t)= {L^I}^* \). Then, for \( i=2 \) and a sufficiently large t, (49) can be approximated as \( g_{2}^*(t) = 1/(\sigma \xi _2) + \beta g_{2}^*(t+1) \). This difference equation has a unique and unstable steady state, where \( g_2^*(t)= [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _2 ]^{-1} \). Because \( 0<g_2^*(t) < +\infty \), \( g_2^*(t) \) must stay at the steady state for large t, which implies \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } g^*_2(t)= [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _2 ]^{-1} \equiv g^*_2 \).
We rewrite (46) as
For sufficiently large t, we have \( a_{2}^*(t) n_2^*(t)=a_{2}^*(t+1) n_2^*(t+1)= {L^I}^* \) and \( g_{2}^*(t) = [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _2 ]^{-1} \). Furthermore, we have \( b_i^*(t+1)=g_{i}^*(t+1)b_i^*(t) \). Using these equations and (50), we obtain
for a sufficiently large t. Using this equation and (49), we obtain
for sufficiently large t. Because \( a_{1}^*(t)=a_1 \left( g_{1}^*(t) \right) = f_1 e^{\xi _1 g_{1}^*(t) } \), the above equation is the first-order difference equation for \( g_{1}^*(t) \) and it has a unique and unstable steady state. Because \( 0<g_{1}^*(t) < +\infty \), \( g_{1}^*(t) \) must stay at the steady state for large t. Because the above equation reduces to (17) in the steady state, \( g^*_1 \) is defined by (17).
We evaluate the RHS of (17) at \( g_{1}^* = [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _2 ]^{-1} \) and \( g_{1}^* = [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _1 ]^{-1} \), where \( [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _2 ]^{-1} < [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _1 ]^{-1} \).
Then, \( g_{1}^* \) is between \( [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _2 ]^{-1}\) and \( [ (1-\beta ) \sigma \xi _1 ]^{-1} \). \(\square \)
Lemma 4
Suppose that Assumption (i) is satisfied (\( 0<\varepsilon <1 \)) and that \( \xi _1<\xi _2 \). There exists a solution for the central planner’s problem such that \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G^*(t)=\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G_{n}^*(t)=\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G_{L^I}^*(t)=\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G_{L^P}^*(t) =\left( g^*_1/g^*_2 \right) ^\phi \equiv G^* >1 \).
Proof
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. Lemma 3 shows that if \( \xi _1<\xi _2 \), we have \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G^*(t)=\left( g^*_1/g^*_2 \right) ^\phi \equiv G^* >1 \). We know from (46) that \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G_{n}^*(t)= \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G^*(t) \). In addition, (43) implies that \( \lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G_{n}^*(t)=\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G_{L^I}^*(t)=\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty } G_{L^P}^*(t) \).
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Hori, T., Mizutani, N. & Uchino, T. Endogenous structural change, aggregate balanced growth, and optimality. Econ Theory 65, 125–153 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1012-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1012-1