Abstract
This paper is aimed at widening the scope of applications of majorized correspondences. A new class of majorized correspondences—domain \({\mathcal {U}}\)-majorized correspondences—is introduced. For them, a maximal element existence theorem is established. Then, sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in qualitative games are provided. They are used to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact quasiconcave games that are either correspondence secure or correspondence transfer continuous.
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Notes
See also Carmona (2009) where a class of games with upper hemicontinuous best-reply correspondences is studied.
The notion of a correspondence transfer continuous game, introduced in this paper, is an improvement on the notion of a generalized weakly transfer continuous game, due to Nessah (2011).
For more details, see Reny (2013, Theorem 3.4).
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I am grateful to Nicholas Yannelis for very helpful discussions and commentary.
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that \(F\) is locally \({\mathcal {U}}_{\theta }\)-majorized. We have to show that it is \({\mathcal {U}}_{\theta }\)-majorized. For every \(x\in X\), there exists an open neighborhood \(U(x)\) and a \({\mathcal {U}}_{\theta }\)-majorant \( F^{x}:U(x)\rightarrow Y\) of \(F\) at \(x\) such that \(F(z)\subset F^{x}(z)\) and \( \theta (z)\notin F^{x}(z)\) for every \(z\in U(x)\). The open cover \( \{U(x):x\in X\}\) has a finite subcover \(\{U(x^{j}):j=1,\ldots ,J\}\). For each \(j\), define \(F_{j}^{\prime }:X\rightarrow Y\) by
Since each \(F_{j}^{\prime }\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(X\) and \(Y\) is a compact subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space, the correspondence \( \overline{F}:X\twoheadrightarrow \) \(Y\) defined by \(\overline{F}(z)=\cap _{j\in \{1,\ldots ,J\}}F_{j}^{\prime }(z)\) for every \(z\in X\) is of class \( {\mathcal {U}}_{\theta }\) (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 17.25). Clearly, \(F(z)\subset \overline{F}(z)\) for every \(z\in U(x)\).
1.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Assume, by contradiction, that \(\varGamma \) has no equilibrium, i.e., \(\mathrm { Dom}\varGamma =X\). Since \(X\) is compact, the open cover \(\{U(x):x\in X\}\) of \(X\) contains a finite subcover \(\{U(x^{j}):j\in J\}\), where \(J\) is a finite set. Let \(\{V_{j}:j\in J\}\) be an open refinement of \(\{U(x^{j}):j\in J\}\) such that cl\(V_{j}\subset U(x^{j})\) for every \(j\in J\) (see, e.g., Urai 2010, Theorem 3.1.3). For each \(j\in J\) and each \(i\in I\), define a correspondence \(\widehat{F}_{i}^{j}:X\twoheadrightarrow X_{i}\) by
We need to show that each \(\widehat{F}_{i}^{j}\) is upper hemicontinuous on \( X \). Fix some \(i\in I\), \(j\in J\), and \(z\in X\). Assume that there exists a relatively open, proper subset of \(X_{i}\), \(W\), such that \(\widehat{F} _{i}^{j}(z)\subset W\). Clearly, \(i\in I(x^{j})\) and \(z\in V_{j}\). Denote \( J_{C}^{z}=\{s\in J:z\in \mathrm {cl}V_{s}\}\). Since, for each \(s\in J_{C}^{z}\) , \(D_{i}^{x^{s}}\) is either nonempty-valued and upper hemicontinuous at \(z\) or empty-valued at \(z\), there exists a neighborhood \(U_{s}\) of \(z\) such that \(U_{s}\subset V_{j}\cap U(x^{s})\) and \(D_{i}^{x^{s}}(U_{s})\subset W\). Then \( \widehat{F}_{i}^{j}(\cap _{s\in J_{C}^{z}}U_{s}\cap (\cap _{s\in J\backslash J_{C}^{z}}(X\backslash \mathrm {cl}V_{s})))\subset W\).
For \(i\in I\) and \(j\in J\), define \(F_{i}^{j}:X\twoheadrightarrow Y\) by \( F_{i}^{j}(z)=\mathrm {co}\widehat{F}_{i}^{j}(z)\) for every \(z\in X\). Then \( F_{i}^{j}\) is compact-valued (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 2006, Lemma 5.29), and, moreover, \(F_{i}^{j}\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(X_{i}\) (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 17.35). Then, for each \(i\in I\), the correspondence \(F_{i}:X\twoheadrightarrow X_{i}\) defined by \( F_{i}(z)=\cap _{j\in J}F_{i}^{j}(z)\) for every \(z\in X\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(X\). Therefore, the correspondence \(\overline{F} :X\twoheadrightarrow X\) defined by \(\overline{F}(z)=\Pi _{i\in I}F_{i}(z)\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(X\).
Consider some \(z\in X\). It lies in some \(V_{j}\). Let us show that \( z_{i^{\prime }}\notin F_{i^{\prime }}^{j}(z)\) for some \(i^{\prime }\in I(x^{j})\). By (ii), there exists \(i^{\prime }\in \cup _{s\in J_{C}^{z}}I(x^{s})\) such that \(z_{i^{\prime }}\notin \mathrm {co}\{\cup _{s\in J_{C}^{z}}D_{i^{\prime }}^{x^{s}}(z)\}\). Since \(\widehat{F} _{i^{\prime }}^{j}(z)=\cup _{s\in J_{C}^{z}}D_{i^{\prime }}^{x^{s}}(z)\), we have that \(z_{i^{\prime }}\notin F_{i^{\prime }}^{j}(z)\). Therefore, \( z_{i^{\prime }}\notin F_{i^{\prime }}(z)\), and, consequently, \(z\notin \overline{F}(z)\).
Since \(\overline{F}\) is of class \({\mathcal {U}}\) and \(\mathrm {Dom}\varGamma = \mathrm {Dom}\overline{F}=X\), \(\varGamma \) is \({\mathcal {U}}^{d}\)-majorized. Then it has an equilibrium by Lemma 5, a contradiction.
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Prokopovych, P. Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games. Econ Theory 61, 541–552 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0874-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0874-y
Keywords
- Majorized correspondence
- Qualitative game
- Better-reply secure game
- Correspondence secure game
- Transfer continuous game