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Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games

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Abstract

This paper is aimed at widening the scope of applications of majorized correspondences. A new class of majorized correspondences—domain \({\mathcal {U}}\)-majorized correspondences—is introduced. For them, a maximal element existence theorem is established. Then, sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in qualitative games are provided. They are used to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact quasiconcave games that are either correspondence secure or correspondence transfer continuous.

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Notes

  1. Some other recent equilibrium existence results can be found in Bich (2009), Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2007), De Castro (2011), Duggan (2007), Monteiro and Page (2007), Prokopovych and Yannelis (2014), and Reny (2011).

  2. Related theoretical results can be found in Baye et al. (1993), Tian (1992), and Yannelis (1991).

  3. See also Carmona (2009) where a class of games with upper hemicontinuous best-reply correspondences is studied.

  4. The notion of a correspondence transfer continuous game, introduced in this paper, is an improvement on the notion of a generalized weakly transfer continuous game, due to Nessah (2011).

  5. For more details, see Reny (2013, Theorem 3.4).

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Correspondence to Pavlo Prokopovych.

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I am grateful to Nicholas Yannelis for very helpful discussions and commentary.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Proof of Lemma 2

Suppose that \(F\) is locally \({\mathcal {U}}_{\theta }\)-majorized. We have to show that it is \({\mathcal {U}}_{\theta }\)-majorized. For every \(x\in X\), there exists an open neighborhood \(U(x)\) and a \({\mathcal {U}}_{\theta }\)-majorant \( F^{x}:U(x)\rightarrow Y\) of \(F\) at \(x\) such that \(F(z)\subset F^{x}(z)\) and \( \theta (z)\notin F^{x}(z)\) for every \(z\in U(x)\). The open cover \( \{U(x):x\in X\}\) has a finite subcover \(\{U(x^{j}):j=1,\ldots ,J\}\). For each \(j\), define \(F_{j}^{\prime }:X\rightarrow Y\) by

$$\begin{aligned} F_{j}^{\prime }(z)=\left\{ \begin{array}{l@{\quad }l} F^{x^{j}}(z) &{} \text { if }z\in U(x^{j}), \\ Y&{}\text { if }z\in X\backslash U(x^{j}). \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

Since each \(F_{j}^{\prime }\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(X\) and \(Y\) is a compact subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space, the correspondence \( \overline{F}:X\twoheadrightarrow \) \(Y\) defined by \(\overline{F}(z)=\cap _{j\in \{1,\ldots ,J\}}F_{j}^{\prime }(z)\) for every \(z\in X\) is of class \( {\mathcal {U}}_{\theta }\) (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 17.25). Clearly, \(F(z)\subset \overline{F}(z)\) for every \(z\in U(x)\).

1.2 Proof of Theorem 2

Assume, by contradiction, that \(\varGamma \) has no equilibrium, i.e., \(\mathrm { Dom}\varGamma =X\). Since \(X\) is compact, the open cover \(\{U(x):x\in X\}\) of \(X\) contains a finite subcover \(\{U(x^{j}):j\in J\}\), where \(J\) is a finite set. Let \(\{V_{j}:j\in J\}\) be an open refinement of \(\{U(x^{j}):j\in J\}\) such that cl\(V_{j}\subset U(x^{j})\) for every \(j\in J\) (see, e.g., Urai 2010, Theorem 3.1.3). For each \(j\in J\) and each \(i\in I\), define a correspondence \(\widehat{F}_{i}^{j}:X\twoheadrightarrow X_{i}\) by

We need to show that each \(\widehat{F}_{i}^{j}\) is upper hemicontinuous on \( X \). Fix some \(i\in I\), \(j\in J\), and \(z\in X\). Assume that there exists a relatively open, proper subset of \(X_{i}\), \(W\), such that \(\widehat{F} _{i}^{j}(z)\subset W\). Clearly, \(i\in I(x^{j})\) and \(z\in V_{j}\). Denote \( J_{C}^{z}=\{s\in J:z\in \mathrm {cl}V_{s}\}\). Since, for each \(s\in J_{C}^{z}\) , \(D_{i}^{x^{s}}\) is either nonempty-valued and upper hemicontinuous at \(z\) or empty-valued at \(z\), there exists a neighborhood \(U_{s}\) of \(z\) such that \(U_{s}\subset V_{j}\cap U(x^{s})\) and \(D_{i}^{x^{s}}(U_{s})\subset W\). Then \( \widehat{F}_{i}^{j}(\cap _{s\in J_{C}^{z}}U_{s}\cap (\cap _{s\in J\backslash J_{C}^{z}}(X\backslash \mathrm {cl}V_{s})))\subset W\).

For \(i\in I\) and \(j\in J\), define \(F_{i}^{j}:X\twoheadrightarrow Y\) by \( F_{i}^{j}(z)=\mathrm {co}\widehat{F}_{i}^{j}(z)\) for every \(z\in X\). Then \( F_{i}^{j}\) is compact-valued (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 2006, Lemma 5.29), and, moreover, \(F_{i}^{j}\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(X_{i}\) (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 17.35). Then, for each \(i\in I\), the correspondence \(F_{i}:X\twoheadrightarrow X_{i}\) defined by \( F_{i}(z)=\cap _{j\in J}F_{i}^{j}(z)\) for every \(z\in X\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(X\). Therefore, the correspondence \(\overline{F} :X\twoheadrightarrow X\) defined by \(\overline{F}(z)=\Pi _{i\in I}F_{i}(z)\) is upper hemicontinuous on \(X\).

Consider some \(z\in X\). It lies in some \(V_{j}\). Let us show that \( z_{i^{\prime }}\notin F_{i^{\prime }}^{j}(z)\) for some \(i^{\prime }\in I(x^{j})\). By (ii), there exists \(i^{\prime }\in \cup _{s\in J_{C}^{z}}I(x^{s})\) such that \(z_{i^{\prime }}\notin \mathrm {co}\{\cup _{s\in J_{C}^{z}}D_{i^{\prime }}^{x^{s}}(z)\}\). Since \(\widehat{F} _{i^{\prime }}^{j}(z)=\cup _{s\in J_{C}^{z}}D_{i^{\prime }}^{x^{s}}(z)\), we have that \(z_{i^{\prime }}\notin F_{i^{\prime }}^{j}(z)\). Therefore, \( z_{i^{\prime }}\notin F_{i^{\prime }}(z)\), and, consequently, \(z\notin \overline{F}(z)\).

Since \(\overline{F}\) is of class \({\mathcal {U}}\) and \(\mathrm {Dom}\varGamma = \mathrm {Dom}\overline{F}=X\), \(\varGamma \) is \({\mathcal {U}}^{d}\)-majorized. Then it has an equilibrium by Lemma 5, a contradiction.

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Prokopovych, P. Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games. Econ Theory 61, 541–552 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0874-y

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