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Decomposition-integral: unifying Choquet and the concave integrals

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Abstract

This paper introduces a novel approach to integrals with respect to capacities. Any random variable is decomposed as a combination of indicators. A prespecified set of collections of events indicates which decompositions are allowed and which are not. Each allowable decomposition has a value determined by the capacity. The decomposition-integral of a random variable is defined as the highest of these values. Thus, different sets of collections induce different decomposition-integrals. It turns out that this decomposition approach unifies well-known integrals, such as Choquet, the concave and Riemann integral. Decomposition-integrals are investigated with respect to a few essential properties that emerge in economic contexts, such as concavity (uncertainty-aversion), monotonicity with respect to stochastic dominance and translation-covariance. The paper characterizes the sets of collections that induce decomposition-integrals, which respect each of these properties.

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Notes

  1. An indicator of event \(A\), denoted \(\mathbb {I}_{A}\), is the random variable that attains the value \(1\) on \(A\) and the value 0, otherwise.

  2. The integral is homogeneous if for every random variable \(X\), and for every positive number \(c,\, \int cX\mathrm{d}v=c\int X\mathrm{d}v\).

  3. The integral is independent of irrelevant events if for every \(A\subseteq N,\int \mathbb {I}_{A}\mathrm{d}v=\int \mathbb {I}_{A}\mathrm{d}v_{A}\), where \(v_{A}\) is defined over \(A,\,v_{A}\left( T\right) =v\left( T\right) \) for every \(T\subseteq A\).

  4. Coincidentally, the notation \(\mathcal{F}^\mathrm{Ch}\), derived from the word chain, resonates with the notation \(\int ^\mathrm{Ch}\) that derives from Choquet.

  5. \(\cup \mathcal{F}\) is a set that contains all \(D\in \mathcal{F}\). That is, \(\cup \mathcal{F}=\left\{ A\mid A\in D\in \mathcal{F}\right\} \).

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Correspondence to Ehud Lehrer.

Additional information

The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of Salvatore Greco, Radko Mesiar, Roee Teper and Peter Wakker and two anonymous referees of Economic Theory whose comments and suggestions greatly contributed to the paper. This research was supported in part by the Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions. Lehrer acknowledges the support of the Israel Science Foundation, Grant #538/11.

Appendix

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1

We show first that the transition from Eq. (3) to Eq. (4) is true. Let \(X\) be a variable and let \(Y=\sum _{i=1}^{k}\alpha _{i}\mathbb {I}_{A_{i}}\) have the following properties: (a) it is \({\mathcal{F}^\mathrm{Ch}}\)-allowable sub-decomposition of \({X}\) (satisfying \(A_1\subseteq \cdots \subseteq A_k\)) that achieves the maximum of the RHS of Eq. (3); (b) \(\alpha _{i}>0\) for every \(i=1,\ldots ,k\). We can assume that there is no other sub-decomposition that satisfies (a) and (b) and (weakly) dominates \(Y\). That is, for every variable \(Z\not =Y\) that satisfies (a) and (b), there is \(\ell \in N\) such that \(Y(\ell ) > Z(\ell )\). We show that \(Y\) is actually a decomposition of \(X\).

Assume, on the contrary, that there is \(j\in N\) such that \(Y(j)<X(j)\). If \(j\in A_{i}\) for every \(i=1,\ldots ,k\), then the set \(\left\{ A_1,\ldots ,A_k, \{j\}\right\} \) is a chain and \(Y'=Y + (X(j)-Y(j))\mathbb {I}_{\{j\}}\) satisfies (a) and (b). Moreover, \(Y'\not = Y\) and \(Y'(\ell ) \ge Y(\ell )\) for every \(\ell \in N\), which contradicts the choice of \(Y\). We may therefore assume that there is an index \(i\) such that \(j\not \in A_{i}\). Let \(i_0\) be the smallest index that \(j \not \in A_{i_0}\). The set \(\left\{ A_1,\ldots , A_{i_0}\cup \{j\}, A_{i_0},A_{i_0+1},\ldots , A_k\right\} \) is a chain. Furthermore, \(Y'=\sum _{i\not =i_0}\alpha _{i}\mathbb {I}_{A_{i}}+ \beta \mathbb {I}_{A_{i_0}\cup \{j\}}+(\alpha _{i_0}-\beta )\mathbb {I}_{A_{i_0}}\), where \(\beta =\min [X(j)-Y(j), \alpha _{i_0}]\), satisfies (a) and (b). Since \(Y'\not = Y\) and \(Y'(\ell ) \ge Y(\ell )\) for every \(\ell \in N\), we obtain a contradiction to the choice of \(Y\). We thus conclude that \(Y\) is a decomposition of \(X\) (i.e., \(X=Y\)).

It remains to show that, ignoring indicators whose coefficients are zero, \(X\) has only one decomposition. That is, \(\{A_1,\ldots ,A_k\}=\{A_1(X),\ldots ,A_n(X)\}\). By definition, \(A_i(X)=\{j\in N; \, X(j)\ge X_{\sigma (i)}\}\). Thus, it is enough to show that if \(m,\ell \in N\) satisfy \(X(m)=X(\ell )\), then \(m\in A_i \Leftrightarrow \ell \in A_i\). Let \(m,\ell \in N\) satisfy \(X(m)=X(\ell )\). If there is \(i_0\) such that \(\ell \in A_{i_0} \) and \(m \not \in A_{i_0} \), then due to property (b) and the fact that \(X=Y,\,X(m)=Y(m)<Y(\ell )=X(\ell )\), in contradiction with the choice of \(m\) and \(\ell \). \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 1

Suppose that there exists an optimal sub-decomposition of \(X\) w.r.t. \(\mathcal{F}\) is obtained by a \(D\)-sub-decomposition (\(D\in \mathcal{F}\)), \(\sum _{A\in D}\alpha _{A}\mathbb {I}_{A}\). Define the set \(D_{X}=\left\{ A\in D\mid \alpha _{A}>0\right\} \). We may choose a sub-decomposition such that \(|D_{X}|\) is minimal. If \(D_{X}\) is an independent collection, the proof is complete. Otherwise, the variables \(\mathbb {I}_{A}, A\in D_{X}\) are linearly dependent. Meaning that there is a linear combination \(\sum _{A\in D_{X}}\delta _{A}\mathbb {I}_{A}=0\) where at least one \(\delta _{A}\not =0\). Without loss of generality, we may assume that \(\sum _{A\in D_{X}}\delta _{A}v(A)\le 0\). Otherwise we could consider \(\sum _{A\in D_{X}}(-\delta _{A})\mathbb {I}_{A}\) instead. Since all \(\mathbb {I}_{A}\) are non-negative, the fact that at least one \(\delta _{A}\not =0\) implies that there is at least one \(\delta _{A}>0\). Let \(\varepsilon =\min _{A\in D_{X},\delta _{A}>0}\frac{\alpha _{A}}{\delta _{A}}\). Since all the coefficients \(\alpha _{A}-\varepsilon \delta _{A}\) are greater than or equal to 0, \(\sum _{A\in D}\alpha _{A}\mathbb {I}_{A}-\varepsilon \sum _{A\in D_{X}}\delta _{A}\mathbb {I}_{A}= \sum ){A\in D}(\alpha _{A}-\varepsilon \delta _{A})\mathbb {I}_{A}\) is a sub-decomposition of \(X\). As for optimality of this sub-decomposition, \(\sum _{A\in D}(\alpha _{A}-\varepsilon \delta _{A})v(A)= \sum _{A\in D}\alpha _{A}v(A)-\varepsilon \sum _{A\in D_{X}}\delta _{A}v(A)\ge \sum _{A\in D}\alpha _{A}v(A)\). Therefore, this is an optimal sub-decomposition. Moreover, for at least one \(A\in D_{X}\), the coefficient \(\alpha _{A}-\varepsilon \delta _{A}=0\), implying that \(\sum _{A\in D}(\alpha _{A}-\varepsilon \cdot \delta _{A})\mathbb {I}_{A}\) is an optimal sub-decomposition of \(X\) that involves a smaller number of indicators than does \(D_{X}\), contradicting the choice of \(D_{X}\). It implies that \(D_{X}\) is indeed an independent collection. \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 2

Suppose that for every independent collection \(C\subseteq \cup \mathcal{F}\), there exists \(D\in \mathcal{F}\) such that \(C\subseteq D\). Define the following set consisting of one collection: \(\mathcal{F}'=\{\cup \mathcal{F}\}\). By assumption, for every \(D'\in \mathcal{F}'\) and every independent collection \(C\subseteq D'\) (i.e., for every independent \(C\subseteq \cup \mathcal{F}\)), there is \(D\in \mathcal{F}\) such that \(C\subseteq D\). Thus, from Proposition 4, \(\int _{\mathcal{F}'}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\le \int _{\mathcal{F}}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\). On the other hand, from the definition of \(\mathcal{F}'\), for every \(D\in \mathcal{F}\) and every independent collection \(C\subseteq D\), there is \(D'\in \mathcal{F}'\) such that \(C\subseteq D'\). Thus, again, due to Proposition 4, \(\int _{\mathcal{F}}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\le \int _{\mathcal{F}'}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\), which leads us to conclude that \(\int _{\mathcal{F}}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v=\int _{\mathcal{F}'}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\).

As for the inverse direction, suppose \(\int _{\mathcal{F}'}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v=\int _{\mathcal{F}}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\), and \(\mathcal{F}'=\{D'\}\) (i.e., \(\mathcal{F}'\) is a singleton). We show that \(\cup \mathcal{F}\subseteq D'\). Assume to the contrary that \(\cup \mathcal{F}\not \subseteq D'\). Then, there exists \(D_{1}\in \mathcal{F}\) such that \(D_{1}\nsubseteq D'\). By assumption, \(\int _{\mathcal{F}'}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\ge \int _{\mathcal{F}}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\), and from Proposition 4, we infer that for every independent collection \(C\subseteq D_{1}\), there is \(D\in \mathcal{F}'\) such that \(C\subseteq D\). Any event in \(D_{1}\) is an independent collection; thus, \(D'\) must include any event in \(D_{1}\) and thus must contain \(D_{1}\) itself (i.e., \(D_{1}\subseteq D'\)).

Finally, consider an independent \(C\subseteq \cup \mathcal{F}\). By the previous argument \(C\subseteq D'\). Since \(\int _{\mathcal{F}'}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\le \int _{\mathcal{F}}\cdot \,\mathrm{d}v\), we obtain from Proposition 4 that there exists \(D\in \mathcal{F}\) such that \(C\subseteq D\), which completes the proof. \(\square \)

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Even, Y., Lehrer, E. Decomposition-integral: unifying Choquet and the concave integrals. Econ Theory 56, 33–58 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0780-0

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