Abstract
Here, we establish a relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms. Both concepts have been used to relate the types in one structure to types in a second “larger” structure. In general, the two concepts may differ, in the sense that a hierarchy morphism need not be a type morphism. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the two concepts coincide. We go on to provide situations under which this condition must be satisfied.
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We thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Adam Brandenburger, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Aviad Heifetz, Marciano Siniscalchi, and Elias Tsakas for helpful conversations. We also thank a referee for invaluable suggestions. Meier was supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia via a Ramon y Cajal Fellowship (IAE-CSIC) and Research Grant SEJ 2006-02079.
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Friedenberg, A., Meier, M. On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms. Econ Theory 46, 377–399 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0517-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0517-2