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Blowing the Whistle

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Abstract

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08005, Barcelona, Spain

    Jose Apesteguia

  2. Department of Economics and Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721-0108, USA

    Martin Dufwenberg

  3. Experimental Economics Laboratory, University of Bonn, 53113, Bonn, Germany

    Reinhard Selten

Authors
  1. Jose Apesteguia
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  2. Martin Dufwenberg
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  3. Reinhard Selten
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Correspondence to Martin Dufwenberg.

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Apesteguia, J., Dufwenberg, M. & Selten, R. Blowing the Whistle. Economic Theory 31, 143–166 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8

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