Summary.
We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each agenda and each profile of voters’ preferences over running candidates, a probabilistic voting procedure selects a lottery on the set of running candidates. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to withdraw their candidacy at any set of potential candidates. More flexible probabilistic voting procedures can be devised if we restrict our attention to the stability of specific sets of potential candidates.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Received: 4 February 2003, Revised: 14 September 2004,
JEL Classification Numbers:
D71, D72.
This is a revised version of a chapter of my Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona. I am indebted to my supervisor Salvador Barberá for his advice and constant support. I am grateful to Dolors Berga and an anonymous referee for their detailed comments and suggestions. I thank José Alcalde, Walter Bossert, Bhaskar Dutta, Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó, Diego Moreno, Clara Ponsatí, Yves Sprumont, and William Thomson for many helpful comments and discussions. I thank the hospitality of the C.R.D.E. at the Université de Montréal and the Department of Economics of the University of Warwick where parts of this research were conducted. Financial support through Research Grant 1998FI00022 from Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca, Generalitat de Catalunya, Research Project PB98-870 from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, and Fundación Barrié de la Maza is gratefully acknowledged.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rodríguez-Álvarez, C. Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures. Economic Theory 27, 657–677 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0564-7
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0564-7