Summary.
We present a new class of rules named “augmented serial rules” for the provision of an excludable public good. First, we characterize this class by the four axioms of strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, access independence, and nonbossiness. Second, we identify two important subclasses by imposing an additional axiom: (i) “anonymous augmented serial rules” by anonymity, and (ii) Moulin’s serial rule by individual rationality.
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Received: 31 December 2002, Revised: 9 June 2004,
JEL Classification Numbers:
D71, D82, H41.
This paper is a substantial revision of “Serial cost sharing with simple games.” I would like to thank Hervé Moulin, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, an associate editor, and three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and detailed comments. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology in Japan (Grant-in-Aid for 21st Century COE Program “Microstructure and Mechanism Design in Financial Markets”).
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Ohseto, S. Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good. Economic Theory 26, 589–606 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0536-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0536-y