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Nonconvex n-person bargaining: efficient maxmin solutions

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Summary.

This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin solutions for some bargaining problems, there is typically a unique efficient maxmin solution.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede, 1455 Copenhagen, DENMARK (e-mail: {jens.leth.hougaard,mich.tvede}@econ.ku.dk) , , , , , , DK

    Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede

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  1. Jens Leth Hougaard
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  2. Mich Tvede
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Received: February 15, 2001; revised version: November 14, 2001

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Hougaard, J., Tvede, M. Nonconvex n-person bargaining: efficient maxmin solutions. Econ Theory 21, 81–95 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0246-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0246-7

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