Abstract.
We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data.
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The minimax and Nash equilibrium solutions coincide in this setting, and we could proceed only referring to the minimax solution and strategies. However, we proceed using the Nash equilibrium framework because we wish to focus on the concept of best response.
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Shachat, J., Todd Swarthout, J. Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?. Math Meth Oper Res 59, 359–373 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354